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Foreword
"Where?" This is the initial response that I receive from most people

when I tell them that I spent a college semester in Bolivia, the Andean nation
nestled in the heart of South America. I am neither offended nor surprised
by the complete lack of knowledge that many people have about the nation,
but I am saddened. I am saddened by the extreme poverty that plagues the
nation, and I am sad that there is no easy

ans~er

to the question which

usually follows the initial "where? ,.... the "why would you ever want to go
there.. .isn't it dangerous?"

Bolivia's reputation as a "dangerous" nation stems from its connection
with the illegal drug trade. Bolivia is currently the world's third largest
cultivator of coca, the raw material used to make cocaine. The US State
Department warns US citizens not to visit the Chapare because it is
"politically unstable." However, the region is not unstable because its
inhabitants are savage people, nor is it dangerous because drug cartel
members roam the streets. Rather, it is dangerous, because of the social
unrest that plagues the region because the poor coca farmers are continuously
being hounded to destroy their coca crops, in the absence of an alternative
means of survival.
I ask that when people read this paper they keep in mind the people
whose lives are being molded by this policy change: the coca farmers. There
are real people involved in this saga. I write it, you read it, but they live it.
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smother the cocaleros' chances of formally organizing against the eradication
efforts. In response to this ultimatum, many of the community leaders have
fled to the surrounding mountains and dense jungle areas in an attempt to
establish some sort of plan. There have already been armed confrontations
and conflicts. Only time can tell how this crisis situation will play out.
The crisis situation in the Chapare is a direct response to the Bolivian
government's new

count~rnarcotics strategy.

The new strategy, announced

on January 1st, 1998, links more closely two pillars of the existing
countemarcotks strategy: alternative development and eradication. Prior to
the new strategy there was no requirement to actually eradicate any coca
before, after, or dllring the period which a farmer received alternative
development aid. That has now changed. Funds are now to be distributed to
groups of farmers at the iocallevel, after they have signed an agreement with
the US Embassy to eradicate all of their coca within. a two-year period. To be
eligible for any crlternative development assistance, including the
development and mamtenance of infrastructure through these programs,
one must agree to phase out the production of all coca within two years. nus
is the first such program in Bolivia to mandate eradication, and the coca
growers are not taking kindly to the change.
Tying eradication to alternative development makes it more difficult
to choose not to eradicate one's coca crops, which it is intended to do, but it
also has the unintended effect of increasing violence in the region. The
adoption of a strategy that forces coca farmers to become completely
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dependent upon alternative crops for their basic survival, would require that
the alternative crops be viable substitutes for coca. As we will see, this is not
the case. While the hectareage of licit crops in the Chapare has increased
substantially, these alternative products are subject to too many variables
which restrict both their marketability and profitability. As a result, the
inherent structure of the Strategy leads to violent confrontations between the

cocaleros and the UMOPAR because the cocaleros are compelled to accept an
unsustainable way of life.
Alternative products are complements to coca, they are not viable
substitutes. The Bolivian government's new Strategy will not be successful as
it takes away the peasants' main source of income without offering a licit
alternative means of survival. This will abet violence in the region as coca
farmers are forced to defend their lone means of survival, their coca crops,
from the forced eradication efforts of Bolivian police forces. Through the use
of personal interviews, academic sources, and current events, this paper will
attempt to prove this hypothesis.
Chapter IT provides a historical framework of the United States "war on
drugs" and the manner in which alternative development fits into the
overall strategy. Chapter III illustrates the past successes and shortcomings of
alternative development strategies, as they have been documented in the
existing literature. Chapter V explains the "Strategia Boliviana de la Lucha
Contra el Narcotrafico 1998-2002," or the Bolivian Counternarcotics Strategy,
and discusses the rationale behind its implementation. Chapter VI addresses

3

the anticipated effects of the Strategy at the time of its exposition to the
Bolivian populous. Chapter VII describes the manner in which the Strategy
has ignited recent inflamed confrontations between coca farmers and police
forces in the Chapare, and draws upon the theoretical evidence presented in
the paper, as well as recent events to prove how the new Strategy is driving
the traditionally peaceful farmers to take up arms to protect their means of
survival.
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Chapter II
Alternative Development & The ''War on Drugs"
Alternative development projects are essential because they provide an
alternative means of livelihood for cocaleros (coca producers) forced to
eradicate their coca crops by the Bolivian government. Eradication without
alternative development is a dead end approach, as it drives poor campesinos
to desperation, destroying their livelihood without offering any replacement.
While alternative development projects are necessary, given the present
structure of the "war on drugs/' they have not proven a viable alternative to
coca production.
Alternative development .strategies will only succeed if the programs
are properly funded, if the farmers have access to the necessary equipment,
and if there are viable markets for the alternative products. Bolivia is a
landlocked country with extremely poor infrastructure. Foreign markets are
not easily accessible.
Unfortunately, the past few years have shown a drastic decline in US
funding for alternative development programs. More resources are being
directed towards Bolivian military and police operations against drug
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trafficking(interdiction). Decreases in US funding for alternative
development programs will prevent development officials from moving
forward in the implementation of new projects. It will also Nnder the
alternative development agencies' ability to make good on past promises and
contracts. This is especially dangerous in light of the fact that many US
funded agencies working in this field have just recently developed trusting
relationships with many of the coca-growing peasants in the Chapare.
In a developing country, such as Bolivia, with an extremely weak and

bureaucratic governmental system, peasants Me not accustomed to the
government delivering on its promises. As a resul't there is much distrust
between political leaders and the populous. When the government promises
the construction of roads, Ibridges, or schools, tne rural peasants are unwilling'
to make substantial sacrifices for the programs, because they realize that a
majority of the times the promises do not become a reality.
On the other hand, many NGOs and US-funded

deve~opment agencies

have worked hard to create a legitimate dialogue with the peasants. The
decrease in funding for promised programs will crush any and all hopes of a
successful alternative development strategy in the Chapare region of Bolivia.
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USlLatin American Relations

Since the establishment of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, the United
States has played an increasingly larger role in Latin American affairs. In the
last ten years or so, relations between Latin America and the United States
have become even more intense. With the end of the Cold War, the axis of
conflict has changed from East/West to North/South, forcing the United
States to pay more attention to nations in the Western Hemisphere.
The United States national security doctrine has changed to reflect new
geopolitical realities. The United State's new security doctrine, "The Doctrine
of Enlargement/' identifies three main threats to "new market democracies/'
or developing nations which have recently adopted the neo-liberal economic
model: drug trafficking, terrorism, and "backlash" rebellious states. 2 This is
where Bolivia fits in. As the world's third largest producer of coca,3 the raw
material used in cocaine production, the US has aggressively engaged Bolivia
in its world-wide battle against drug production and trafficking.

Coca: Production and Applications

Coca...the four letter word that represents life to some and death to
others. It is the main theme by which the United States has defined its large
role in Bolivia. First off, it is imperative to define coca; the leaf, the crop, and
2Garcia Interview. Cochabamba, Bolivia. November 20, 1996.
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what it means to the Bolivian people. The coca leaf is a small green leaf that
is grown on a bush, mainly in two rural areas of Bolivia: the Chapare and the

Yungas regions. Coca is known to have been cultivated for at least 4,000 years
in Bolivia, as well as many other countries including Colombia, Ecuador,

Peru, Chile, Paraguay, Brazil, and Argentina. The crop itself is extremely
advantageous. It yields four crops annually and is extremely easy to grow. It
does not require constant attention or care.
Coca is not only a good agricultural crop, but it has tremendous
marketability in Bolivia. A large percentage of the indigenous population
buys coca leaves daily in local markets for chewing purposes." The traditional
chewing process of the leaves consists of simply drying them in the sun,
crumpling them up into a ball, and masticating.
The leaf has many important functions. The most important, in the
eyes of many Bolivians, is its ability to suppress sensations of hunger and
fatigue. This is very important to a people who have "limited financial
resources, and a dire need to work long hours each day. For many of the poor
indigenous laborers, coca replaces the three traditional daily meals. It is
estimated that between seven and eight million Andean people still chew
coca daily.4 The majority of these people can be found in Bolivia and Peru.
In addition to the traditional mastication of the coca leaf, various other

medicinal applicatiOns have been recognized over the years. The coca leaf

3 "lNCSR Executive Summary." April 1994. p. 64-65.
4Roncken. Theo. Coca, Cocaine, The "War on Drugs" and Andean Answer.r.: CEDffi. Cochabamba,
Bolivia. J994.
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contains substances which can be used to regulate oxygen shortage, blood
pressure, menstrual cramps, formation of muscular cells, as anesthesia, anti
diahrettics, and it aids in the digestion of fats and sugars, among other things.s
Along with the discovery of the wide uses of the coca leaf has come the
marketing of "coca products." Examples of coca products include coca tea,
coca shampoo, coca toothpaste, coca chewing gum, and many others.
As of 1995, Bolivia was producing 48,600 hectares worth of coca plants.6

While coca is not cocaine, it does contain 0.5% cocaine. Unfortunately, that is
enough to render it as the necessary raw material in the production of the
deadly drug. While there are proven beneficial uses of the coca leaf, its biggest
claim to fame and consequent downfall is that it is associated with cocaine.
That is a very negative thing to be associated with in the eyes if the United
States, who is faced with large amounts of drug abuse, and a crisis which is
"ripping society apart at the seams." As long as Bolivia remains the third
largest producer of coca in the world, the United States is going to have
something to say about it.

SMolina. Reynaldo. COINCOCA. Internew. Cochabamba. Bolivia. October 1996.
6o'US Embassy Fact Sheet." La paz; November 13. 1996.
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US Policy and ''The War on Drugs"

The Cold War has ended and the US has waged a new war with just as
much vigor and conviction as the last. The war of the late eighties and
nineties has been "The War on Drugs." In 1968, President Nixon declared a
"war on drugs", establishing among other things, the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) in 1973. The DEA continues to play the leading role in
the drug war in Bolivia today. In the 1980s, President Reagan declared drug
trafficking a threat to national security.
Along with the declaration that it was a national security issue, came
the militarization of the "war."7 The Bush and Clinton administrations have
continued to fight this war intensely, each year devoting enormous amounts
of resources towards these efforts. Between 1996 and 1998 alone, the United
States spent approximately US$596,155,OOO

on narcotics and anti-crime

programs. The breakdown of such costs follows.

7

Garcia Interview. November 20, 1996.
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Table#!
FY 1996=1998 International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
Budget Summary by Functional Activity
(5000)
FY 1996
%0£
FY 1997
% of
FY 1998
Enacted
Total
Plan
Total
Request

% of
Total

Law Enforcement
Assistance and
Institution
Development

59,185

43.9

85,735

44.4

99,425

46.5

Economic Incentive/
Eradication

42,521

31.5

66,208

34.3

80,800

37.8

International
Organizations

7,710

5.7

12,000

6.2

7,000

3.3

Drug
Awareness/Demand
Reduction

3,610

2.7

3,550

1.8

3,095

1.4"

Law Enforcement
Training

5~00

3.9

6,700

3.5

5,200

2.4

Program Development
and Support

16,629

12.3

I8$>7

9.7

18,480

8.6

Total Narcotics
Programs

134,955

100

193,000

100

214,000

100

Anticrime Programs

18,200

20,000

16,000

Total Program Plan

153,155

213,000

230,000

~:

United States Department of State, Buretlu fOT Interru1ti01U11 N(lTcot1cs and LAw
Enforcement Affairs. International Narcotics Control Strategy Report. March 1997. p. 32.

The "war on drugs" is fought on two fronts; supply-side and demand
side. "Demand-side" measures include addict treatment, education and
prevention programs. "Supply-side" measures include the eradication of coca
crops, prevention of new crop plantings, interdiction of drugs coming into
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the US at the border, the attempted identification and dismantling of cocaine
laboratories, as well as attempts to destroy cartels. The aim at each stage of the
"war" is to make it more dangerous and costly to produce, sell, and consume
drugs.
Bolivia, is a nation that is extremely affected by the US's supply-side
efforts. The country is an intricate part of the US's plans to stem coca
production at the root. The rationale is that if there is no coca production,
then there can be no cocaine production, nor consequent abuse of the drug.
Between Fiscal Years 1984 and 1994 Bolivia received 851.214 million dollars in
US Economic, Narcotics Enforcement, and Military Aid alone towards these
ends. (See Table #2)

Table #2
FY 1984-1994

US Economic, Narcotics Enforcement, and MilitatY Aid to Bolivia
(Figures in Millions of US Dollars)

Economic

Police

580.991

125.822

Military
144.401

Total:
851.214

Source: Youngers, Coletta. "The Andean Quagmire: Rethinking US. Drug Control
Efforts in the Andes." WOLA Briefing Series: Issues in International Policy. March
1996.

The Certification Process
In the past decade the United States government has aggressively

pursued its "source country" strategy, hoping to combat cocaine where it is
produced. In Bolivia, the world's third largest producer of the coca leaf as
well as the second-largest producer of refined cocaine, US government policy
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has pressed for the eradication of coca, following the logic of no coca, no
JJ

cocaine."
A major component of this strategy is the United States annual
JJcertification process" of the anti-narcotics efforts of some 26 nations. The
certification process was created by a 1986 amendment to the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961. Section 490(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act states: the
President of the United States by Jaw must certify to Congress whether each
producing and/or drug transit country during the previous year has
cooperated full.y with the United States or has taken adequate steps on its own
to:
•

meet the goals and objectives of the United Nations Convention Against lllicit Traffic

in Narcotic

Drugs and Psychotropic Substances including action on such issues as illicit

cultivation, production, distnbution, sale, transport and financing, and money laundering,
asset seizure, extradition, muruallegal assistance, law enforcement and transit cooperation,
precursor chemical control, and demand reduction;

•

accomplish the goals described in an applicable bilateral narcotics agreement with the

United States, or a multilateral agreement; and

•

take legal and law enforcement measures to prevent and punish public corruption

especially by senior government officials-that facilitates the production, processing, or
shipment of narcotic and psychotropic drugs and other controlled substances, or that
d.iscourages the investigation or prosecution of such acts.

•

Alternatively, a country that cannot be certified under the foregoing standard may be

certified on the grounds that he Jlvital national interests of the United Sates require" that
assistance be provided and that the United States not vote against multilateral
development bank lending to the country. FAA. Section 490(b)(1)(B) 8

BUS Department of State. JnternaMnal Narcotics Control Srraugy Report(1NCSR). March 1996.p. 24-25.
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The US Embassy emphasizes that the process is simply a means by
which the President of the United States assures Congress that nations
receiving US development aid and assistance are not hostile towards the US
in relation to the war on drugs." In a conversation with a high level
U

official,9 it was stressed that the process does not consist of the United States
U

certifying" all of these developing nations' anti-narcotics efforts to the

international community, and deeming them worthy or unworthy as a
nation. It is simply a mechanism by which.the President proves to Congress
that the US and the recipient nation see eye to eye on the issues of drug
production and trafficking, which are currently considered threats to US
National Security.
However, this is clearly a US-view of the Certification Process. It is
imperative to take into account the way which this law is viewed in Bolivia,
especially in widely respected academic circles. Fernando Garcia is a wellrespected academic in Bolivia. He was the Director of CEDIB, the Document
Publishing Center in Cochabamba. He is currently the Director of the Political
Science Department at the Universidad Mayor San Simon in Cochabamba.
Speaking with him while in Bolivia in November 1996 shed a new light on
the subject. 10

Garcia suggests that a major component of having successful
hemispheric economic and social integration, is the adoption of common
90l sen Interview. La paz, Bolivia. December 3, 1996.
IOGarcia Interview. November 20, 1996.
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economic models. In the Western hemisphere this entails the adoption of a
nee-liberal economic structure in each nation. This is where the certification
process comes in, according to Garcia. By conditioning "war on drug" and
economic aid on the application of structural adjustment plans, the US
controls Bolivia's economic development. "War on drug" aid stretches far
beyond coca crop eradication efforts, to include funding of programs which
help the nation in many ways, such as police and military training,
infrastructure development, alternative agricultural development programs,
and the improvement of the Bolivian judicial system.
Garcia claims that the US is really using the process as another way to
foster Bolivia's dependency upon the US, and assure that the relationship
remains a beneficial one for the US. The economic agreements inherently
structure the Bolivian economy towards an agro-exporting economy based on
the export of raw materials. Even the "alternative development programs"
funded by USAID, which are offered as an alternative to coca, are defined as
being used to structure the economy towards an export economy. As a result
of all of these actions, Bolivia's dependency on the United States has been
further exacerbated. We further discuss the effects of the certification process
on local level coca farmers in Chapter 6.
Bolivia is classified by the United States as a "Major drug producing
and drug-transit country." A major drug producing country is one that
cultivates 1,000 hectares or more of illicit opium poppy, 1,000 hectares or
more of coca, or which cultivates 5,000 hectares of illicit cannabis, significantly

l5

affecting the United States, according to the Certification Law. l1 The US' main
basis for judging Bolivian anti-drug efforts each year, is by how well it
upholds its own ''Ley 1008," or ''Law 1008" to eradicate the illegal production
of coca.

Ley 1008 (Law 1008)
Bolivia's Law 1008 permits the legal cultivation of up to 12,000 hectares
of coca in "traditional" zones within the Yungas and in one old settlement of
the Chapare region. These are the two main areas where the production of
Bolivian coca takes place. "Traditional" coca is used for tea, chewing, or for
ceremonies; it is not to be processed for cocaine extraction. All other coca is
either"excess and transitional" or it is illegal. Excess and transitional coca is
that which was growing in the Chapare and in parts of the Yungas not
deemed "traditional," at the time of Law 1008's passage in 1988. Transitional
coca is to be eradicated over time. Law 1008 calls for 5,000-8,000 hectares to be
eradicated annually, subject to the availability of funds in the Bolivian

treasury and from international donors. All other coca, including newlyplanted coca in transitional regions, is illegal. Illegal coca is subject to
immediate eradication without economic compensation, nor alternative crop
implementation 12 .

I:NCSR, March 1996. p, 6-7,
12Ibid. p, 24.

II
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The law also criminali2:es, for the first time in Bolivian history, coca
cultivation except in certain expressly identified areas. Law 1008 states that:
• In the Yungas (near La paz) the coca crop is used primarily for traditional

and licit purposes, and up to 12,000 hectares are permitted for legal
cuItivalion;
• In the Chapare (in the Department of Cochabamba) in contrast, the law

establishes a framework by which coca cultivation would be gradually
eradicated;
• Any coca cultivation outside of the Ytmgas and the Chapare is illegal.
As a result of the limitations on legal coca production, a sector of
society is losing out economically, This sector is the coca growers. It is
estimated that over 200,000 people are directly involved in different phases of
cocaine production, and some 40,000 peasant families grow coca in the
Chapare region alone. 13 As a result of US eradication efforts, families are
being left without a means of economic survival.
Along with the more aggressive destruction of newly planted coca'
crops, has come the Unites States push for net reductions in hectares of coca
grown in Bolivia each year. In 1994 and 1995, Bolivia reached the US's
eradication targets; however in both years there was a net increase in hectares
of coca grown. 14 A main reason that the US Embassy and the President are
pushing for net decreases in coca production is that it is very hard to convince

I3Human Rights Watch Americas (HRWA). Bolivia Human Rights Violations and the War on Drugs.
First Annual Report on Bolivia Volume 7, Number 8. July 1995.
l4>tmbassy Sheet OD Coca Cultivation and EradicatiOD," November II, 19%.
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Congress that nations with continual increases in coca production are

OUI

alliances in. the drug war. According to a high level official in the US
Embassy in La Paz, Congress "doesn't want to hear the sob stories or about the
intricacies involved in eradication, they only want to see the numbers, and
while Bolivia is really pushing to meet US quotas, it is difficult when you
have people constantly planting new cropS."15
As a result of the political and economic pressures felt by the Bolivian

government to comply with US desires, oftentimes the well-being of the coca
producers takes a back seat to international demands. The Bolivian
government

~

dependent upon the multilateral and bilateral funds that are

contingent upon compliance with US-set standards. This effort to meet the
requirements of the certification process" is directly reflected at the local
f1

level, as we will see in Chapter 5. Eradication efforts are often met by peasant
resistance. However, the efforts must continue in order to continue the flow
of funds to Bolivian coffers. As a result, the poor peasant coca farmer is left
without a means of survival. Alternative development projects attempt to
bridge this gap. They aim to provide the ex-coca farmer with a licit means of
income.

150lsen Interview. December 3, 1996.
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US Strategy: Alternative Development
A. What is Alternative Development?

Coca is a traditional crop grown mainly by peasant farmers. In some
areas, such as the Chapare, the local economy has become almost entirely
dependent upon illicit crop cultivation. Despite its illegality, growing coca
provides many farmers with a basic living; for other farmers, it improve'
their meager standard of living and ensures economic survival. The allure of
the coca crop is that it yields substantially more revenue than legal crops.16
Alternative development projects, such as those supported by the
UNDCP(United Nations Drug Control Programme) and USAID (United
States Agency for International Development}, assist farmers in finding
alternative crops and markets to eventually eliminate their dependence on
drug crops. These projects often work closely with local communities in
remote rural areas where the incentives to grow illegal crops are greater
because social and economic conditions in these areas are alarmingly poor.
The cultivation of illicit crops typically occurs in developing countries, which
often lack the resources to monitor and patrol remote areas.
Farmers are given assistance to work themselves out of an economy
dependent upon coca. Many peasants are willing to harvest legal crops if
their basic survival is enstired, even though their earnings are unlikely to
match drug crops. According to the UNDCP, some farmers want to rid

16UN International Drug Control Programme. Fcuing the Challenge. 1996. p. 5-6.
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themselves of their dependence on a single crop that links them to violent
drug trafficking intermediaries, and exposes them to law enforcement
measures that often destroy their crops, not always with compensation.
Furthermore, many growers are tired of living under the fear and uncertainty
of growing drug crops that place their lives and their livelihood at risk.
UNDCP and US government assistance is conditional upon some type
of commitment from recipient governments, communities and non
governmental organizations (NGOs) to prevent, reduce, and eventually
elimiriate illicit cultivation, processing, trafficking, and abuse in project areas.
According to the UNDCF, specialized crops introduced with the
assistance of UNDCP projects have earned about 70-80 percent of the price a
farmer could earn from a drug-cropF However, while these products are said
to yield

~arge

fulandal returns, it is important to understand that this

assumes the farmer's ability to properly care for the products. Moreover,
these returns are contingent upon the farmer's ability to both secure markets
for the products and physically deliver them to market. These are no easy
tasks in the dense jungle region of the Chapare. As a result, UNDCP
initiatives often offer much broader assistance than Simply providing seeds
for an alternative crop.
A comprehensive alternative development project is intended to offer
farmers technical expertise in selecting, harvesting, processing and marketing
substitute crops. In addition, UNDCP projects often complement the work of

171bid. p. 5.
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others in the overall economic improvement of a

~ountry

or a region by

developing its infrastructure. For instance, it has helped communities build
roads, irrigation channels, develop electrification projects, obtain dean
drinking water supplies, and develop health centers and social service
programs.
The UNDCP recognizes that no single approach to alternative
development is suitable for all countries. Even within a country, each region
needs a strategy carefully tailored to fit its legal, economic and cultural nonns.
Local community support and active participation in the implementation of a
strategy are prerequisites for success.
The UNDCP supports alternative development projects in the Chapare
region of Bolivia, where farmers live in poverty and the density of drug crops
is amongst the highest in the world. 18 Coca crops have been replaced with

palm oit palm hearts, essential oils, rubber and fruit trees. In some areas,
industrial processing plants were established to process food. The project also
developed complementary services such as health care, clean water

supp~y

systems, basic sanitation, and informa[ basic education.
These projects are designed and implemented by experienced and
knowledgeable development officials, who supposed[y understand that
community participation is a "prerequisite for success." However, one of the
greatest downfalls of alternative development is that the projects are not

18MinnicJc. Gregory. "Alternative Development-The Bolivian Experience." October 13. 1997. His written
repon presented in Vienna i:n 11/97. Gregory Minti.ick was 'the Chief Technical Advisor for UNDCP
Bolivia. (ADfB0U97/C23).
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demand-driven. The community does not determine the types of projects
carried out, what crops are introduced, nor the technological processes
employed in the production process.
The projects are almost entirely implemented from above. Instead of
attempting to employ traditional cultivation processes or engaging the
community in a dialogue about the types of crops that they feel would be
successful, it has been a history of UNDeP officials introducing carefully
detailed plans to the recipient communities. As long as communities are not
involved at each step of the project's development and implementation,
there can be no hope for a sucx:essful or sustainable development strategy.
Now that we have established a basic framework of alternative development,
let us explore the Bolivian case.

B. Bolivia; Alternatiye Development Stratqy-USAID

At the core of the Alternative Development strategy in Bolivia is the
promotion of sustainable, broad-based, free-:market economic grqwth with a
special emphasis on providing viable alternatives to the illegal coca'
economy.1 9 This strategy intends to expedite the transition from a coca-based
economy to one which relies on legal non-coca sources for income and
growth. The evolution of this strategy is closely linked with the structural
changes in the Bolivian economy since 1985. Prior to 1985, the Bolivian

19~1arkey. John. US Dept of State. Alternative Development in the Chapare: Getting Results.. 1997
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economy was plagued by a hyper inflationary spiral that culminated in the
world's seventh worst case of inflation in history. Since 1985, Bolivia has
stabilized and liberalized its economy as dramatically as any country in Latin
America. Economic growth reemerged in the late 19805 and has accelerated in
the early 19905. 20
Given the mobile nature of labor in Bolivia, the strategy has placed the
highest importance on nationwide macroeconomic growth, so that a growing
economic pie can attract not only former coca farmers and laborers, but those
who would otherwise be potential entrants into the coca labor force. USAID's
own worldwide experience in crop substitution and area development also
supports this nationwide approach because illicit crop production is mobile,
thereby requiring a national strategy, not merely a regional or crop strategy.
Policy dialogue and the promotion of new economic opportunities
nationwide are the core of the Alternative Development strategy at the macro
level. To accelerate macroeconomic growth, the strategy particularly stresses
trade and investment. Increased stability, improved economic policies, better
market opportunities, and economic growth provide the foundation for
increased investment and trade.
Increasing economic growth, however, is not enough for coca farmers
and others to choose alternative economic opportunities. Therefore, AID is
presently executing and designing projects at the micro level to facilitate the
transition for workers from the coca industry. The cornerstone of these

20Jbid.
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projects are the Chapare and Cochabamba Regional Development
Projects(CORDEP), which consists of two main branches: the PDAR
(Cochabamba Regional Development Project) and DAI (Development
Alternatives, Inc.).
These projects provide farmers with the agricultural technology,
equipment, credit, and the rural infrastructure to make alternative economic
opportunities attractive. Since Alternative Development is predicated on
successful counter-narcotics activities, the approach is to work before, during,
and after eradication takes place, with an emphasis on the latter.
Again, with these USAID projects we see a lack of community
involvement, as was evident with the UNDCP project. While USAID has
partnered with NGOs, which usually leads to increased community
involvement at all stages of the process, the communities in the Chapare are
still very much recipients of USAID alternative development packages, as
opposed to active participants in the development and implementation
process.
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Chapter III
Effects of Alternative Development Programs
Have alternative development projects succeeded in meeting their
desired objectives? Depending upon with whom one speaks, the responses to
this question may vary greatly. There are some who would choose to
illustrate the successes of these programs, and concentrate on the positive
effects that they have had on the communities involved. At the same time,
there are those who would contend that the programs have been failures for a
variety of reasons. It is imperative to explore both sides of the argument to
better understand the types of successes and failures that these programs have
registered in the past.
One starting point is the official stance of the US State Department's
Agency for International Development. According to the latest progress
report by the Bolivian Desk Officer in the State Department, the programs in
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the Chapare region have registered great success. 2l The report states that the
joint USAID-Govemment of Bolivia Alternative Development Program has
emerged as " a uniquely successful model for creating sustainable alternative
incomes for farmers in coca growing communities."22 Following years of
investment, research and steady progress, the program is now yielding results
far beyond what had originally been expected, according to USAID.
This joint program has received $111 million in USAID funds and $70

million in Government of Bolivia funding since 1983.23 The report holds
that the efforts of the past few years have resulted in progress in diversifying
crops, improving product quality, and expanding national and foreign
markets. The report also holds that the hectareage of licit crops in the
Chapare is now three times greater than coca cultivation, and 127% greater
than in 1986. The strong demand for planting materials is said to reflect
farmers' growing confidence in their· ability to profitably produce and market
these crops.
Furthermore, the report emphasizes that access to markets for the
goods is no longer an obstacle for the alternative products thanks to the
infrastructure and market development assistance provided by USAID. To
date, 2,974 kilometers of roads have been improved or maintained, and 83
bridges have been built. Another very important aspect of USAID's argument
is that even with the increased amount of licit crops, farm-gate prices have
remained high because of the improved roads, opening of new domestic and
foreign markets, and improved product quality. USAID also claims that even
though coca prices have remained high, along with the increased seriousness
211bid.
22Markey. John.
23 Ibid.

us Dept of State.
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of the Government of Bolivia's eradication programs and the success of
alternative development initiatives, farmers are actively participating in
these programs.
The main products developed under the USAID program are bananas,
pineapples, palm hearts, and black pepper. Thanks to this program, licit
agricultural production in the Chapare now represents 1.5% of Bolivia's gross
domestic product.24 USAID claims that the successes documented in such
reports have enabled the GOB(Govemment of Bolivia) to effectively counter
arguments that coca eradication impoverishes poor farmers, leading them to
believe that the resulting swing in public opinion has finally made the goal of
total coca eradication politically feasible. As a result, the Bolivian
government has become increasingly more aggressive in its proposed plans of
action. With this supposed newly-found support of the populous, the
enactment of forced eradication programs has become both a possibility and a
probability.

Alternative Development and The Summit of the Americas_

There are also those who are not so quick to flatter the results of
alternative development strategies, especially of programs in the Chapare. In
1996, 34 American heads of state and government met in Miami to discuss
issues of importance in the region. The meeting was called The Summit of
the Americas. The issue of drug trafficking was among the top issues
discussed at the conference. The goal was to ratify the basic elements of
bilateral and multilateral counternarcotics agreements signed by the nations
over the course of the past decade.
24
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The leaders decided that the main point of contention was to
determine whether crop producing nations could implement those programs
already on the books, because their conclusion was that the record on
established crop reduction programs has not been good.2S In contrast to the
assessments of the US State Department, the Summit of leaders determined
that the crop reduction programs have not made substantial progress over the
past years. This was determined by examining data from the past few years,
which shows that overall cultivation and production of illicit drugs has
increased in the Chapare.
Table #3
Bolivian Dru~ Net Production: Coca Leaf 1987-1995
(in thousands of metric tons)

l28Z

~

78

78.4

128.2 122Q l22l
76.6

77

78

~

~

80.3

84.4

1994 1995
89.8

85

Source: INCSR 1996, p24-25.

When these figures are considered in relation to the amount of funds
invested in countemarcotics efforts (See Table #2) by the United States alone,
it appears to have been an abysmal failure. Between FY 1984 and FY1994

alone the United States spent over $851,214 million dollars on its
counternarcotics efforts. As a result of the recognition that the existing
strategy has not solved matters, the region's presidents at the Summit of the
Americas decided that something had to change. However, they realized that

simply enforcing eradication would not be effective, because this would
simply lead to the creation of another problem-a huge percentage of the
population without a means of income.
25Gamarra, Eduardo. Implementing the Summit a/the Americas: I 996;p9-I2.
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As a result, their Plan of Action called on leaders to seek I/national and
international support for development programs that create viable economic
alternatives to drug production."u Essentially, this statement recognizes that
past programs have failed to provide successful alternatives to drug crops,
and that only through increased international cooperation in the
administration of such programs can progress be made towards these ends.
The following is a summary of the main failures of alternative development
programs addressed at the conference:
Table #4
Summit of the Americas' Plan of Action Countemarcotics Initiative:
Crop Reduction &, Alternative Development:27

.

- Not much progress has been attained. Coca crops have expanded, and
alternative development programs remain largely underfunded.
-Pew markets are available for the alternative products.
• Desperate need of new markets for the alternative products.
- Unwillingness to use aerial chemical sprays.
• Funding for alternative development is scarce.
- UN funding is best bet, but is still minimal.
-USAID funds have been cut and are unlikely to increase in the future.

It appears that the main obstacles to the success of these programs is the

absence of markets

~d

the underfunding of such programs. However, there

is another dimension of the programs which has created obstacles to their
implementation and success. The problem lies in the lack of availability of
necessary technical support. Once the difficult task of persuading the fanners
to switch to the cultivation of these licit products has taken place, the lack of
technical support to facilitate this transition causes irreversible problems.
26Ibid. p. 10.
27lbid. p. 12.
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While USAID claims that they provide farmers with agricultural
If

technology, equipment, and rural infrastructure to make alternative
economic opportunities attractive"28 this is clearly not the case. Again, we can
cite the lack of community involvement in devising such strategies as an
obstacle to its success. If USAID attempted to employ production processes
with which the local communities were familiar, then there would be no
absence of advanced agricultural machinery and technologies.
Furthermore, the fact still remains that no other crop has been
identified that can provide the income derived from coca. As a result, if the
transition to the production of these alternative crops is further complicated
by a lack of assistance {both economic and technical}, then the farmer will slip
back into his traditional! means of production. While alternative
development programs have not had overnight success, they are still the only
scheme around to deal with the hundreds of thousands of Andean coca
growers.
Defending alternative development does not mean that enforcement
efforts should be forgotten. This is not a black and white issue. The US
government's position is that the Pum of Action initiative in combating
illegal drugs provides a way to integrate alternative development programs
with law enforcement strategies. The Clinton administration has made

efforts to link alternative development with crop eradication programs and to
recognize its importance to the overall US counternarcotics strategy.
Since the goal of alternative development, as a component of the
counternarcotics strategy, is not to increase the production of alternative
products, but to decrease coca production, eradication is the next supply-side
step. Straight out military action is not the humanitarian answer in a
28 Markey. John. US Dept of Stale.
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democracy. As a result, by linking forced eradication to economic aid, the
Bolivian and United States governments are avoiding much backlash from
humanitarian groups and the international community.

Forced CroV Eradication and Alternative Development Programs

Over the past few years the funding for alternative development
projects has decreased. Along with this move away from alternative
development initiatives has come an increase in the funds allocated to
another pillar of the US counternarcotics strategy: the military side.
According to an article in Latin American Weekly Report. 29 both the Clinton
administration and the new government of Hugo Banzer appear to agree that
the policy of compensated eradication of coca, under which farmers have
been paid US $2/500 for every hectare of coca replaced by other crops/ has been
to blame for this state of affairs.
Consequently, the amount of US aid allocated to Bolivia to finance the
compensation program has been cut in half, to only US$7.5m for the
remainder of this year.3O More resources are to be devoted instead to pollee
and military operations against drug-trafficking (interdiction), while direct
military aid to Bolivia is to be cut. This change in the allocation of resources
is especially interesting, as it is not a direct result of an increase in total

military aid to the nation. There is a clear reason why the administration has
decided that funds would be better spent on military efforts at the local level.
The change in policy will not be welcomed by the residents of the
Bolivian Chapare. The virtual elimination of US alternative development
"US CUts Aid to Bolivia for Alternative Development" Latin AmerU:an Weekly Report. September 2,
1997. p. 416.
30 Ibid.
29
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aid is being regarded by the Chapare growers as tantamount to a declaration of
war.31 Advisor Filemon Escobar, a veteran trade union

~eader, says

the

inevitable consequence of the reduction in compensation payments will be
forced eradication, which growers will resist to the death, as they Mll have no
alterna tive.
Alternative development is a valuable pillar of the supply-side efforts
of counternarcotics initiatives. There is very little argument about the need
for crop-substitution programs within the present structlll'e of the war on
drugs. There is, however, debate about the successes that these programs
have registered. Not only is there debate about the past success of such
programs, but there is serious question as to whether or not such programs
even have the potential for success in the Chapare region of Bolivia.
A key argument that many critics point to in their arguments about the
failures of alternative development is the compelling economic rationale
behind coca production. The fact remains that, to date, ,there is no crop that
yields higher returns than coca in the Chapare. Coca i:s grown in larger
quantities than all other alternative products combined. 32

Ibid.
32Table 6-3, Smilh, Peter H. Drug Policy in lhe Americas. p. 90.
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Product

laPaz

Cochabamba

Bolivia

Coca

33.2

62.8

28.5

Totals:

100

100

100

SQurce: Data Supplied. by Unidad de Analisis de Politicas Econ6micas (UDAPE), Instituto de

Estadlsticas. Government of Bolivia. 1989.

There is a basic economic rationale behind the Bolivian peasants'
decision to produce coca versus other crops. There is a strong world demand,
driven by cocaine consumption, which in turn, makes coca production a
profitable enterprise for the campesino. Like any other homo economicus,
the coca producer is making a rational decision in response to signals from
the market.33 This is an economic choice, not a moral or political one.
Accustomed to chewing coca, campesinos tend to be unaware of and
unconcerned about the hazards to the health of far-distant consumers.
Andean peasants therefore make decisions about the use of land and labor.
There is a need for a cash crop to complement foodstuffs, and coca meets that
need.
Furthermore, the price elasticity of supply is very high because the
availability of land, labor, and technology enables the campesinos to react- to
market prices. Despite short-term oscillations in prices for coca leaves, profits
from coca remain far superior to those from any alternative crop.34 Coca can
also be grown on land on which other crops might not be successful; at the
same time coca shrubs develop and grow quickly

50

that, in the short term,

production can be increased to meet market demand. Also, the requisite
technology for production is well-known by campesinos, as opposed to the

33Justiniano• .!JIose Guillenno. 'The Power of Coca Producers." Drug Policy in the Ame7Uas.p. 100:
34 Ibid. p. 99.
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sometimes confusing processes involved in the production of the alternative
crops.
Finally, and very importantly, coca-producing areas are generally
located in tropical or subtropical zones, which have very difficult access,
resulting in high transportation costs. These areas are consequently
inadequate for perishable crops with low bulk sale value. Further, the
internal market for foodstuffs is small, because campesinos tend to grow their
own food and urban workers have very low purchasing power. Coca, by
contrast, is easy to transport; it does not deteriorate easily due to climatic
conditions; and it has a wide demand in foreign markets. It is therefore
difficult for other crops to be competitive.
When these factors are taken into account, in conjunction with the
living conditions and social position of cocaleros within Bolivia, it becomes
extremely apparent why coca is the crop of choice, and alternative
development can be problematic. The standard of living for many Andean
campesinos is comparable to the lowest levels in Africa.35 When a human
being is living under some of the harshest conditions known to man, he is
existing to survive. Rationally, he will do all necessary to put food on the
table and to keep a roof over his head. Coca is a crop that is easy to produce,
has a high demand, and yields immediate returns. The rational campesino
will, as a result, produce coca.
In addition, the campesinos, for the most part, are in a sense separated

from mainstream Bolivian society. As Jose Guillermo Justiniano, a Bolivian
economist argues "In general, the vast majority of the campesino population
has not been integrated into national society. The permanent weakness of the
states plus the lack of vision on the part of the long time ruling classes have
35

Ibid. P 100.
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failed to provide adequate solutions to the historic problem of rural
poverty ."36 Within

this context of almost

total isolation hom the rest of

Bolivian society, and subsequently the international community, rural
farmers are pushed into coca production.(See Table #6)
Moving peasants out of coca production will clearly introduce
significant socio-economic and political changes in the region. Table 6 gives
us a more profound understanding of the extent to which coca production is
ingrained in the Chapare region. Alternative development programs are not
only geared towards changing the economic processes of the region, but they
are faced with the obstacle of dismantling an economic process thalt dictates
many other aspects of the coca farmers' lives such as political organization

and kinship relations. When we begin to understand the extent to which
coca production is ingrained in the region, it becomes evident why the
programs have not r:egistered overwhelming successes.

Table#6
Employment
FamiHes
Producing Coca

.Families and Workers in COca-Cocaine ~cle
Chapare
Yungas
Yapacani
35,492
23,299
2,400

People Employed
in Coca
Production

105,003

People Employed 9,780
in Sulfate
Production

36

Bolivia
61,641

14,091

1,733

120,827

410

110

10,300

Ibid. P 100.
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Employment
People Employed
in Processing
Paste

Chapare
NA

Yungas
NA

Yapa cani
NA

Bolivia
20,000

Total
Employment in
Cycle

201,275

150,000

13,440

364,715

SQurce: Data supplied by Unidad de Analisis de Politicas Econ6micas (UDAPE), lnstituto de
Estadisticas, 1989.

Afraid of Change: Risk-adverse Behavior

As a result of the aforementioned factors, it is difficult to imagine that
coercive measures .against campesinos could ever register positive results.
Pe-asants producing coca have absolutely nothing to lose. As long as coca
provides a family livelihood, that other products carmoti coca growers wUl
protect their coca crops at all costs.
But, one may ask...even though campesinos have maintained a certain
quality of life through the production of coca, why would they not be willing
to risk the little that they have in hopes of experiencing grea1ter gains through
the production of alternative crops? The answer is that the coca farmers are
willing to take a chance and invest in the production of alternative crops.
They are not, however, willing to do this at the expense of eradicating all of
their coca fields. It appears that the coca farmers consider the alternative
products to be complements to coca crops, not substitutes. They are not
confident that the production of alternative products can financially support
them, thus they are ill1wi1ling to forsake the production of coca, as they are
afraid that without their economic "safety net" they will be unable to survive.
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In his text book, Economic Development in the Third World. Michael
P. Todaro explains the rationale behind risk uncertainty, and survival in
j

areas of subsistence farming. Todaro explains that throughout the Third
World, agriculture is still in this subsistence stage. But in spite of the relative
backwardness of production technologies and the misguided convictions of
some foreigners who attribute the peasants' resistance to change as a sign of
incompetence or irrationality, the fact remains that given the static nature of
the peasant's environment, the uncertainties that surround him, the need to
meet minimum survival levels of output, and the rigid social institutions
into which he is locked, most peasants behave in an economically rational
manner when confronted wfth alternative opportunities.37
According to the standard theory a rational income or profit
maximizing farm. or firm will always choose a method of production that will
increase output for a given cost or lower costs for a given output level.38 But
the theory is based on the crucial assumption that farmers possess "perfect
knowledge" of all input-output relationships in the form of a stable
production function for their crop. This is the point at which the theory loses
a good deal of its validity when applied to the environment of subsistence
agriculture in Latin America.
Subsistence agriculture is a highly risky and uncertain venture. It is
made even more so by the fact that human lives are at stake. In regions
where farms are extremely small and cultivation is dependent upon
uncertainties, such as a high variability of rainfall, average output will be low.

In poor years the peasant and his family will be exposed to the very real
danger of starvation. In such circumstances the main motivating force in the
j

31Todaro. Michael P. £COMmie Development in the Third World. Longman Inc. White Plains, New
York; 1985. p. 305.
33 Ibid.
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peasant's life may be the maximization, not of income, but rather of his
family's chances of survival. 39
Accordingly, when risk and uncertainty are high, a small farmer may
be very reluctant to shift from a traditional technology and crop pattem that
over the years he has come to know and understand, to a new one thalt
promises higher yields(or in our case a more secure lifestyle) but may entail
greater risks of crop failure. When sheer survival is at stake, it is more
important to avoid a "bad" year(i.e, total crop failure) than to maximize the
output in better years.40
We may conclude that peasant farmers do act rationally and are
responsible to economic incentives and opportunities. Where innovation
and change fail to occur, we should not assume that peasants'are stupid,
irrational, or conservative; instead, we should examine carefully the
environment in which the small farmer operates to search for the particular
institutional or commercial obstacles that may be blocking or frustrating
"constructive" change. Efforts to minimize risk and remove commercial and
institutional obstacles to small farmer innovation are, therefore, essential
requirements of agricultural and rural development.
In the Chapare, efforts to minimize risk and remove commercial and

institutional obstacles to small farmer innovation would include the
following: the development of legitimate markets for the alternative goods,
the establishment of more production and packing facilities in the region, the
existence of reliable infrastructure that would ensure the punctual transport
of goods to market, and increased technical assistance at each step of the
cultivation process. While these are relatively long term goals, there are
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid,
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short-term economic incentives that the GOB and USAID could use in the
short run to encourage the transition to alternative crop production. The
GOB and USAID could subsidize the alternative products until the time that
the aforementioned criteria are met. As long as US funds were promised to
aid in the subsidization this would take the risk factor out of the transition
l

process by ensuring financial returns on the risky venture.
This leads us into an analysis of alternative development/crop
substitution programs. First we consider the pros and cons of such programs.
Then we will explore the specific experiences of such programs in the
Chapare region of Bolivia.

Advantages of Alternative Development Programs

There are those critics who hold that alternative crops are, in facti more
profitable and advantageous than the traditional coca crop. As Patrick
Clawson and Rensselaer W. Lee ill suggest, contrary to a widely held belief,
net income from coca is not always higher than that from legal cropS.41 For
example in the Upper Huallaga Valley, returns from local citrus bananas,
l

l

and agriculture have compared favorably with those from coca, according to
data from the Special Upper Huallaga Valley Project (pEAH), which was set
up by USAID.42 In Bolivia, a 1992 USAID study found that a variety of
nontraditional crops could compete successfully with coca at prevailing leaf
prices as seen in Table #7.
l

However this data does not take into account the farmers'
l

unfamiliarity with the alternative productsl his lack of access to proper
Clawson, Paaick L. and Lee, Rensselaer w.
York; 1996. p. 143-144.
42 Ibid.

4\

m.
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technology, nor the lack of infrastructure to facilitate the fluid movement of
goods. Simply referring to the theoretical advantages of producing the
alternative crops, does not prove that farmers would benefit from the
cultivation of these products. There are many other factors to be considered.
Table #7
Bolivia: Coca Compared to Legal Crops. 1992
(Dollars per Hectare, except where noted)

Coca

Bananas

Pineapple

Citrus

Black
Pepper

Investment Cost

1,120

887

5,068

908

4,575

Net Income

1,480

1,023

3,764

1,731

1,647

Days of Farmer
Labor

277

155

224

261

182

Net income per
day

5.34

6.60

16.80

6.63

9.05

1,320

5,722

1,917

2,678

Note: Net Income 1,772
without capital
cost

Source: Clark, Joel. Alternative Development of the Cha,pare, June 1992, Tables 1 and 26 and
authors' assumption of a 20 percent interest rate. Net income is before labor costs.

Calculations of costs and income are always approximate, so too much
importance should not be attributed to small differences in the estimated net
income per hectare of per day labor. Coca, bananas, and citrus are all in the
same rough range, while pineapples earn more for those who can afford the
higher investment they require and the longer wait until the investment
pays off. The accuracy of these calculations seems to be borne out by the
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behavior of farmers, who recently have been producing more pineapples and
bananas rather than more -coca. 43
A much better indication of the profitability of coca farming relative to
other crops is to look at what fanners are actually doing. 44 Here there is a
puzzle for those who would claim that coca is several times more profitable
than other crops. If coca is so much more profitable, then we would expect
the area planted with coca to expand rapidly. After all, there is a lot of land
available and a lot of underemployed labor looking for better work. Indeed,
the area planted with coca rose rapidly when coca prices were booming in the
decade from the late 19705 through the late 19805. Since 1989, this area has
continued to increase, but at much a much slower pace. (See Table #8)
The facts that less land is planted with coca and there are fewer workers
in the Chapare has not translated into lower coca output, partly because
bushes planted earlier have now reached their most productive phase.45
Also, a shift toward more advanced production techniques, using more
chemical inputs and less labor, has increased yields. In short, coca production
is no longer on the steep upward track of the 19805. In Bolivia, production is

stagnant as farmers concentrate on other crops. 46
This suggests that the goals of alternative development strategies have

been met, as they have been successful in providing farmers with alternative
crops. If the success of alternative development projects is to be judged by an
Ibid.
Ibid.
4S Ibid.
46 Ibid
43

44
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mcrea,Se in the cultivation of the encouraged products, then the projects have
met their goals. However, if one considers a decreased dependency on coca
production to be a criteria for success, the projects have been relatively
unsuccessful. Clawson and Rensselaer suggest that "coca production is no
longer on a steep upward track...", however there is no evidence to suggest
that it is on a sharp downward track, suggesting that the alternative products
are indeed complements to, not substitutes for, coca cultivation.

Disadvantages of Alternative Development Programs

Until now, bilateral and mwtilateral aid for rural development
programs geared towards changing coca crops for legitimate production has
not been very successful, for various reasons. First, it is difficult Ito persuade
campesinos to reduce or destroy coca crops when profits are high. for the
most part coca prices have remained very. stable over the years, discouraging
farmers from changing crops.
Second, most development projects have been pilot programs on a
reduced scale due to scarce resources. For that reason it has not been possiMe
to distribute resources ·to all of the relevant producers. In some cases, friction
has arisen because of the perceived discrimination in favor of coca producers
who participate in the reduction programs.
Third, technical and economic solutions in coca-production areas take
a relatively long time-five to ten years-to achieve concrete and positive
results. In subtropical areas, due to the quality of the soil and climatic
conditions, the majority of the programs-if they are feasible-must be based
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on long-cycle perennial crops and on commercialization processes that
require a slow maturation process. 41 This time frame is too remote, and it
creates uncertainty on the part of the campesinos. The alternative crops fail
to provide a means of daily survival. The poor peasant cannot think in terms
of the benefits that will be derived in the long run, when his family does not
have food today.
The INCSR (International Narcotics Control Strategy Report) published
annually by the US Department of State seems to suggest that this is so.
According to Table #8, net coca cultivation has actually increased over the
past few years, and in 1996 overall cultivation had increased by 200 hectares
over the 1991 level.
Table#8
INCSR Statistical Tables
1996
1995
1994

1993

1992

1991

COCA

Net Cultivation"

(ha)

48,100

48,600

48,100

47,200

45,500

47,900

Eradication

(ha)

7,512

5,493

1,100

2,400

5,149

5,486

Cultivation

(ha)

55,612

54,093

49,200

49,600

50,64"9

53,386

Leaf Potentially
Harvestable

(mt)

75,100

85,000

89,800

84,400

80,300

78,000

Coca leaf

(mt)

76.40

110.09

202.13

201.25

188.90

5.45

Coca Paste"""

(mt)

0.05

0.02

0.01

0.33

0.94

Cocaine Base........

(mt)

4.60

6.44

5.30

7.70

3.12

...

Seizures

6.78

47 Ibid.
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Cocaine HCL
,. .... **
Agua Rica #

(mt)

1996

1995

1994

1993

1992

1991

3.17

3.59

1.02

0.31

0.70

0.32

16,874

14,255

50,820

23,230

(ltrs)

Arrestsl
Detentions
Labs Destroyed

na

600

1,469

1,045

1,226

1,003

Cocaine HCl

na

18

32

10

17

34

Base

na

2,226

1,891

1,300

1,393

1,461

Domestic
Consumption
Coca Leaf (licit)## (mt)

13,300

13,300

13,300

13,300

10,000

10,000

Source: International Narcotics Control Strategy Report. United States Department of State,
Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. Match 1997.p 71.

There are various explanations that can be employed to explain the
recent increase in coca cultivation. Three of the most important are soil
problems, the high transportation costs of alternative products, and a lack of
accessible markets for the alternative products. Kenneth Eubanks, a
contractor for USAID, noted in 1991 that the Chapare's prospects seem
especially problematic because "suitable alternative crops with acceptable
marketing margins will be difficult if not impossible to identify."48
James Jones, an anthropologist specializing in the Chapare, came to a
similar conclusion: "Some areas of the Chapare, because of their ecological
fragility, should have neither roads nor agriculture. So why build roads

4ll0awson, Patrick L. and Lee, Rensselaer W.
York; 1996. p. 149.

m.

The Andean Cocaine Industry. SL Martin's Press, New
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there? Why try to develop these areas?"49 This leads us into the second
critique-geographical remoteness. The Chapare region is removed from the
markets of Cochabamba and Santa Cruz. While the two hour ride to
Cochabamba and the four hour ride to Santa Cruz may not appear distant on
a map, the main problem lies in the constant impassability of the respective
roads.
In the rainy season, poor weather conditions and landslides frequently
obstruct travel. In addition, the trip to the large Buenos Aires market takes
two days from the Chapare. The principal consequence of remoteness is high
transportation costs/ averaging 60 percent of the value of products from the
Upper Huallaga Valley and 80 to 85 percent of the value of Chapare
products.SO Because of these high transport costs/ certain crops can be sold
only in the local markets; a larger harvest would require shipment to markets
far enough away as to make the transport uneconomical.

A third factor contributing to the lack of success of such programs lies
in the lack of confidence on the part of farmers that there truly are markets
for the alternative products. Certain particularly promising crops, such as
passion fruit and papaya in the Chapare cannot be exported in the fresh form.
As a result many of the farmers are not even willing to grow the crops unless
processing facilities are introduced in the region. 1his is a development that
would take years.

49'Iboumi. Francisco. Economia Politica y NarcotTafico . Bogota: Tercer Mundi, 1994. p 260. Found in
Clawson and Lee. p. 152.
SOfbid.
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When farmers develop confidence that the markets exist, they can shift
quickly. In the Chapare, farmers were skeptical in the early 19905 that they
would be able to sell the bananas and pineapples that USAID was encouraging
them to grow. Markets in Lima, Peru, and Buenos Aires, Argentina have

m

fact emerged as a result of USAID projects. These projects range from the
construction of roads to the search for wholesalers in destination markets.51
As farmers saw how much pineapples could earn, they became so eager to

plant the crop that, in 1993-1994, the price of starter plants rose so high that
pineapple farmers could make as much from the starter plants as from the
fruit. 52 Unfortunately, nothing of the sort has happened since the pineapple
boom.
As we have seen, while alternative development projects have

allowed some farmers to cultivate crops other than coca, they have failed to
truly provide a viable, dependable alternative to coca production. This is
made even more evident by the failure of the Chapare region to register net
decreases in coca production in the region. The increase in the area of
alternative crops grown in the Chapare clearly suggests that the products have
been accepted to a certain extent. However, the absence of a corresponding
decrease in coca production implies that the alternative products are simply
complements to coca production. They are not viable substitutes.
As a result of the failure of alternative development strategies to

provide farmers with a licit alternative to coca cultivation, the farmers
51 Ibid.
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remain economically dependent upon coca. However, while alternative
development may not have succeeded in providing coca farmers with a
viable alternative to coca production, these programs appear incontestable on
paper.
It appears as if the GOB and US governments are offering an

alternative means of survival to the coca farmers forced to eradicate their
illegal coca crops. In theory it is rational, but in practice it has not worked. As
a result, the GOB's new Strategy will abet violence in the region as the coca
farmers will be forced to defend their primary means of survival from the
forced eradication efforts of the Bolivian government.

52 Ibid.
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Recently, the United States government revamped. its "war on drugs"
strategy, earmarking more funds for interdiction efforts (i.e. military and
police activities) than compensation programs, such as alternative
development. This initially caused many people to question how the
decrease in funds for alternative development programs would affect the
development workers' ability to implement and execute effective programs.
My initial thesis was that the decrease in funds would compromise the
success of such programs at the local level.
The opportunity to undertake fieldwork in Bolivia added a new
dimension to the investigative process. The purpose of the trip to Bolivia
was to speak with as many people as possible about the decrease in alternative
development aid. The local level coca farmers were the sector of society upon
which most of the research was centered, and as a result they were the main
group of people targeted in the interview process.
A list of questions to be asked at each meeting was devised. There was
one set of questions for government officials, USAID development workers,
academics, and NGO workers.(See Chapter IV, Appendix IT) There was a
second list of questions for use in the field with the coca farmers.(See

Ch~pter

4, Appendix I) While a majority of the cocaleros (coca farmers) speak
Quechuan, an indigenous Andean language, the questions were prepared in
Spanish. It was determined that a child or another willing member of the
community could be paid to assist with translations when and if it was
necessary.
While it was necessary to speak with government officials and
development workers, the main focus of all research activities was to
determine the effects that the decrease in funds would have at the local level.
Consequently, as much time as possible was to be spent in the Chapare region
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of Bolivia, where a majority of the coca is produced, and where the large
majority of alternative development funds are invested.

Obstacles of Fieldwork

There were two main anticipated obstacles to the research process; the
limited period of time, and being an American woman. Let us first address
the obstacles of the time constraint. A main concern of academic researchers
doing fieldwork is the ability to develop a level of trust in the community
which' one is working. As a result of the limited time frame of a one month
long research period, gaining long term trust would prove virtually
impossible. Consequently, the first few days in Bolivia were to be spent
attempting to contact USAID, NGOs, or non-governmental organizations,
and human rights groups about potentially accompanying them to the
Chapare, to attempt to piggy back on established relationships with peasants.
In Bolivia it would be both dangerous and impractical to attempt to

travel to the Chapare alone, in hopes of speaking with the local people. The
region is neither politically nor geologically stable, and is consequently no
place for a 21 year old woman to be traveling alone. As a result, the
aforementioned agencies were contacted in hopes that they would soon be
traveling to the region, and would not mind the company of a curious
researcher. Clearly it would be more desirable to accompany an academic
researcher or someone without any US or GOB affiliations, so that coca
farmers would not draw any connections between the research being
conducted and US or Bolivian government agencies. However, in the face of
such a restricted time period, it would be necessary to weigh the options
presented, and take advantage of the best possible scenario if it would provide
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the opportunity to visit alternative development projects and speak with the
growers.
The second anticipated obstacle to doing fieldwork in Bolivia is being
an American woman. These two components present separate issues in
themselves. Traveling alone, as a young woman in a Latin American
country presents some serious safety concerns. As a result, certain proposals
for trips or arranged meetings with men, that stretched beyond the usual
business setting, would have to be carefully considered and planned before
agreeing to the terms of such arrangements.
Being an American would actually prove advantageous in arranging
meetings at USAID and USAlD-sponsored agencies. However, for. many of
the same reasons that it would be an advantage at these agencies, it would be
a disadvantage in the rural areas; the precise areas being targeted. As a result
of the US's role in counternarcotics affairs in the region, DEA agents are the
only Americans with which many of the local peasants have ever had
contact. These agents are the same Americans that accompany Bolivian
police forces in their routine eradication efforts. As one can imagine, the
DEA agents are extremely unpopular with the cocaleros, or coca farmers.·

The anticipated obstacles did in fact present some problems, but were
not detrimental to the research efforts conducted- in Bolivia. In fact, the
geological instability of the Chapare region proved to be the largest obstacle to
the month-long fieldwork, and this setback actually proved advantageous in
the long run, as it allowed for a more intense investigation of the issue in the
urban area.
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The Actual Bolivian Experience

Arriving in La paz on December 30, 1997, two days before the Bolivian
government announced its new "Bolivian Strategy for the Fight Against
Narcotrafficking 1998-2002" had a profound effect on the ultimate focus and
direction of the research process. The GOB's (Government of Bolivia) new
strategy aimed to link more closely alternative development efforts with the
eradication of coca. In order to receive any alternative development
assistance, induding the development of infrastructure through these
programs, one must agree to phase out the production of all coca within two
years. This is the first such program in Bolivia to mandate eradication, and
the peasants are not taking kindly to the.change.
It was an amazing time to be in Bolivia studying countemarcotics

initiatives. The new program was making headlines for weeks and the issue
was an extremely controversial one. The program was announced on
January 1st, and on January 27th, coca producers from all over Bolivia were
demonstrating in the streets of Cochabamba, opposing the new strategy. The
controversy had yet to die down. This still, quite obviously, is the case.
It eventually became evident that the people with whom I spoke were

far more interested in.discussing the GOB's· new plan, than they were in
discussing the probable effects of a decrease in funding. All conversations
seemed to come full circle back to the subject of the GOB's new Strategy. The
direction of my research soon changed to reflect the obvious interests of the
Bolivian people.
Cochabamba appeared to be the rational place to start the investigation
process. The majority of the people involved with development
organizations in the Chapare work and live in Cochabamba. The climate of
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the Chapare is very hot and muggy and the roads to the region are limited
and of poor quality; therefore the development folks generally prefer to live
in the city.
After being in Bolivia for only four days, the goal of finding a way to
get to the Chapare was achieved. Technicians from USAID extended an
invitation for a four day visit to the Chapare. That very night the highway
from Cochabamba to the Chapare washed off the side of a mountain on
account of heavy rainfall which had turned the highway into a quasi-mud
slide. The Chapare is only accessible to Cochabamba by this specific highway,
as a result aU communication between the two areas halted. It was estimated
that after a few days the road would be repaired and travel to the region
would once again resume. Unfortunately this was not the case. The end of
January signified the beginning of the rainy season, which promised a
continuation of the muddy conditions for at least another two months.
Fortunately, USAID has four wheel drive vehicles that were allowed to
pass through the feet deep mud. Unfortunately, the Bolivian government
was not even permitting the passage of such vehicles until two weeks later.
As a result, all hopes of visiting the Chapa.re with non-governmental

organizations was out of the question. USAID and the UNDCP are the only
development agencies in Cochabamba with the economic capacity to purchase
such vehicles, aside from the Bolivian government. They are also the only
agencies with the political connections to be allowed access to the region,
even when such access has been strictly forbidden. Consequently, they would
provide the only hope of getting to the region.
As a result of the mudslides, the first part of the month was spent in

Cochabamba speaking with technicians, government officials, academics,
journalists, and cocalero leaders. This actually proved to be quite
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advantageous, allowing more time to become familiar with current issues
before going to the Chapare.
It was soon discovered that conducting research during the month of

January presents some problems of its own. January is the summer month
during which most Bolivian professionals take some time off. Consequently,
some of the people with whom I wanted to speak simply were not available
for contact. Furthermore, many US nationals working in Bolivia for
development agencies often take the month of January as a vacation month.
As a result, interviewing Bolivian and US workers, alike, became quite a

challenge.
One woman, however, Maria Elisa Martinique of the UNDCP agreed to
a January 2nd meeting. Martinique was the first to downplay the effects of the
decrease in funding for alternative development programs. She stressed that
the reason for the decrease in such funds is that the "hard work" has already
been done. 53 She explained that the construction of infrastructure in the
Chapare had aheady taken place, there was potable water and electricity in
half of the region, as well as roads to provide access to the main cities. As a
result, less funds are now required for such programs. She suggested that this
is now the point where private sector investment needs to begin to bear the
brunt of the economic burden for such projects. Maria Elisa suggested a
meeting with Gregory Minnick, the Director of the UNDeP in Cochabamba.
Minnick also expressed the same pOint of view as Maria Elisa regarding
the decrease in funding for alternative development programs. He stressed
that at this stage in the game, it is time that private sector investment begins
to bear the burden of funding such programs. He explained that the UNDeP
is looking for a sort of "exit strategy" in the region. The funding that they
~3 Martinique. Maria Elisa- Interview.

UNDCP. La Paz., Bolivia. January 2, 1998.
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have been receiving is running out, because the purposes it was meant to
serve have been met. He wants private investment to pick up where UNOCP
programs have left off, having provided for the construction of roads,
electrification, and providing potable water in the region. He suggested that it
is time for private investment to add sustainability to the model which the

UNDep has been implementing. This interface between the public and

private sector is further explored in Chapter 6.
Minnick also explained how the nature of compensation programs is
changing from individual to community-based efforts. As he was explaining
the new program, it was apparent that it reflected Ambassador Romero's
suggestions for the steps that must be taken in order to make alternative
development programs more successful. In a November 1997 meeting,54
Ambassador Romero outlined the failures of the $2500 compensation
program, and stressed the need for more community-based development
programs.

The Re-evaluation of my Research: A Change in Course

Drawing the connection between Peter Romero's declaration of a need.
for a more community-based strategy, with the GOB's decision to move
towards a community-based strategy, led to a re-examination of the course of
research. Suddenly it became apparent that this interesting change was a
more important event in the alternative development scenario than the
probable effects of a decrease in funding for such programs. This revelation,
coupled with the GOB's proposal of the new Strategy against drug trafficking,
54 Romero, Peter. Interview. US Department of Stale. Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for

Latin American Affairs. Washington DC. November 11, 1997.
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led to the compilation of a new set of interview questions(See Chapter 4,
Appendix ill) to help analyze how the transformation from individual to
community-based compensation and eradication measures would affect the
rural poor, in the face of decreasing alternative development funds.
Claudia Vargas in the PDAR, which is an organization funded and
maintained by USAID, shared her views next. She encouraged me to explore
the way in which the proposed plan would affect the ability of rural farmers
to access the necessary funds, and also to explore the extent to which the
p~ogram

is being accepted by the cocaleros.

She set up a meeting with Jack Roscholt, the Director of DAl, another
organization funded by USAID. Mr. Roscholt was extremely helpful in
describing the interaction that takes place between the various agencies
funded by USAID in Cochabamba. He explained the changes, and was not
very supportive of the US and Bolivian governments' new strategy. He said
that it basically ties the hands of USAID in terms of the farmers that they can
now assist.
Next, Fernando Garcia, a very well respected academic in Cochabamba,
agreed to an interview. Fernando was previously the Director of CEDIB, and
is currently the Head of the Political Science Department at the Universidad

San Simon in Cochabamba. He has published various articles on the
coca/cocaine issue, and is often looked to by government officials and
cocaleros alike for information and opinions on the subject.
Garcia added a whole new dimension to the alternative development
dialogue: the political side. He stressed that the alternative development
programs were, in reality, a Band-Aid used to ameliorate some of the pain of
coca producers, but that they are by no means a long term solution to the
problems faced by cocaleros. He expressed deep concern about the new
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strategy that ties alternative development to forced eradication, suggesting
that it would force the cocaleros into an impossible situation. He also stressed
that violent confrontations would most likely be seen in the Chapare
immediately before I'certification time" because the GOB would be very
aggressive in its eradication efforts, while the coca farmers would defend their
crops at all costs.
That same day a meeting was scheduled with Cristina Cardosa from
CEDIB. She was in the process of conducting research in the Chapare, for a
project very similar to my own. It was very interesting to discuss her
findings. Cristina really was, up until that point, the person who had the
most contact with cocaleros. This provided the opportunity to discuss how
policies have been accepted. or rejected by the rural farmers, the main
objective of the research.
Jose Infantes, Director of the USAID Regional Counternarcotics Office,
was the next person who agreed to discuss the issue. He had a copy of the
proposed Strategyl but refused to share it, claiming that it was a private
document of the Bolivian government We discussed the probable impacts of
the proposed plan, and the reaction that it wowd ignite amongst the coca
growers themselves.

The Tnt! to the Chap.are

FinaUy, it was time to go to the Chapare. The trip which should have
taken two hours in our well-equipped Ford Bronco, ended up lasting eight
hours. Driving through the

night~

it was extremely dangerous, as there were

constant mud slides that sent endless streams of mud into the road, blocking
the traffic at steady intervals. There was thunder and lightening, the
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magnitude of which was incredible. Fortunately the trip was extremely
productive, which made up for the long wait.
The following day a meeting was held between coca producers and
USAID agents. As a result, the opportunity was presented to speak with coca
producers. As it turns out, Claudia Vargas of the PDAR has developed
numerous personal relationships with the peasant women. Being with her
put the women at ease, and they spoke very openly about the issues at hand.
They were more than willing to answer any questions. They were not afraid .
to criticize the programs or complain about the recent change in strategy.
Hours were spent speaking with one woman in particular. She later
explained that she is the head of the women's organization in their
community, and that her husband is a "dirigente"(director) of her
community's peasant organization. Interestingly, together they shared very
opposing views. It was amazing to witness the debate that ensued within that
particular family about what should be done in response to the proposed
plan. The husband stressed that it was necessary to comply with the demands
of the Bolivian and US governments and agree to get rid of all coca within a
two year period. The wife, on the other hand, claimed that it was simply not
a rational choice. If they were to get rid of all coca, what crop would they rely
upon? To say the least, this is no easy question, and there are no easy
solutions.
The trip to the Chapare also provided an opportunity to watch USAID
officials interact with the coca producers. It was extremely interesting to
watch the director of USAID in Bolivia discussing the programs with a coca
producer who only speaks broken Spanish because his native language is
Quechuan. It would have been ideal to send more time in

th~

Chapare, but

unfortunately the matter was beyond anyone's controL
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strategy that ties alternative development to forced eradication, suggesting
that it would force the cocaleros into an impossible situation. He also stressed
that violent confrontations would most likely be seen in the Chapare
immediately before certification time" because the GOB would be very
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growers themselves.

The Trip to the Chapare

Finally, it was time to go to the Chapare. The trip which should have
taken two hours in our well-equipped Ford Bronco, ended up lasting eight
hours. Driving through the night, it was extremely dangerous, as there were
constant mud slides that sent endless streams of mud into the road, blocking
the traffic at steady intervals. There was thunder and lightening, the
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magnitude of which was incredible. Fortunately the trip was extremely
productive, which made up for the long wait.
The following day a meeting was held between coca producers and
USAID agents. As a result, the opportunity was presented to speak with coca
producers. As it turns out, Claudia Vargas of the PDAR has developed
numerous personal relationships with the peasant women. Being with her
put the women at ease, and they spoke very openly about the issues at hand.
They were more than willing to answer any questions. They were not afraid .
to criticize the programs or complain about the recent change in strategy.
Hours were spent speaking with one w·oman in particular. She later
explained that she is the head of the women's organization in their
community, and that her husband is a "dirigente"(director) of her
community's peasant organization. Interestingly, together they shared very
opposing views. It was amazing to witness the debate that ensued within that
particular family about what should be done in response to the proposed
plan. The husband stressed that it was necessary to comply with the demands
of the Bolivian and US governments and agree to get rid of all coca within a
two year period. The wife, on the other hand, claimed that it was simply not
a rational choice. If they were to get rid of all coca, what crop would they rely
upon? To say the least, this is no easy question, and there are no easy
solutions.
The trip to the Chapare also provided an opportunity to watch USAID
officials interact with the coca producers. It was extremely interesting to
watch the director of USAID in Bolivia discussing the programs with a coca
producer who only speaks broken Spanish because his native language is
Quechuan. It would have been ideal to send more time in

th~

Chapare, but

unfortunately the matter was beyond anyone's control.
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Upon returning from the Chapare a meeting was arranged with Oscar
Coca, an attorney and popular advisor to coca farmers. This meeting proved
to be one of the most valuable. Oscar Coca was very different from the
government employees. He spoke very frankly about the problems that the
proposed plan was going to cause, and had already caused, in the Chapare. He
also allowed me to make a photocopy of the "top secret" proposal of the plan,
that the USAlD folks refused to hand over. His insights on the issue were
invaluable.

A Brief Reflection on the Research Process

Taking into account the mudslides and the fact that many people were
vacationing during January, the research went very well. For the most part
people were willing to share their views on the touchy subject with an
American research student. Furthermore, the fact that the timing of the trip
coincided with the announcement of the new plan, proved to' be a decisive
factor in the direction of the research process.
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Methodolol}' Appendix I
List of InteIViews
NAME

rosmaN

11/14/97

Peter Romero

11/14/97

Johanna Mendelson

Principal Deputy US Department of State
Assistant
Secretary of State
for Latin
American Affairs
Co-Director, Post Office of Transitions
Corillict Unit
Initiatives, USAID
Director
Yugoslavia
Haiti/Uberia
PhiUipines
Rwanda
UN ECLAC
Poverty Unit, lADB

DATE

ORGANIZATION

lI.M

also at

on, USAID:

11/17/97

Bill Yeager
Dave
Cynthia Fletcher
Chris O'Donnell
Heather
Dr. Ines Bustillo
Dr.Ruthanne
Deutsche
John Markey, Jr.

11/17/97
11/17/97

Peter Hakim
Steve Holtzman

11/17/97

Usa Haugaard

Director

BOLIVlA
12/31/98

Bill Reiser

Director

11/14/97
11/14/97

Bolivian Desk
Officer
President

1/5/98
1/5/98

Maria Elisa
Martinique
Greg Minnick
Claudia Vargas

1/6/98

Lee Cridland

1/6/98

Jack Roscholt

Director

1/9/98

Cristina Cardosa

1/9/98

Fernando Garcia

Senior
Researcher
Director of
Political Science
Department

1/2/98

Director

US Department of State
InterAmerican Dialogu,
Post Conflict Unit
World Bank
Latin American
Working Group
Security Department
US Embassy La Paz
.UNDCP, La paz
UNDCP, Cochabamba
PDAR, USAID
Cochabamba
Red Andina '
Cochabamba
DAr, USAID
Cochabamba
CEDIB Cochabamba
UMSS Cochabamba

60

1/21/98

Jose Infantes

Director

1/14/98
1/23/98
1/23/98
1/23/98
1/23/98
1/23/98
1/26/98
1/26/98

Tom Kruse
Emesto Salinas"
Richard Fisher"
Carlos Sarabia·
Dr. Miguel Rocha··
men and women
Roberto Lasema
Oscar Coca

Director

-Spoke with in the
Chapare.

VP

Director
Director
Dirigente
Cocaleros
Director/ Author
Advisor /Lawyer

USAID
Countemarcotics
Division
SrT Program
FONADAL
USAID- Bolivia
PDAR
Producers Association
Producers Associations
CERES Cochabamba
Advocacy Group
Cochabamba
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Methodology Appendix II
Initialilnterview Questions
Elite Interview QuesHQnslUSA and Bolivia
What role has alternative development played in the US's "war on drugs?"
What specific purpose are these projects intended to serve?
What is your reaction to :the cut in alternative development funds? Will this
compromise the local level projects' ability to receive adequate funding?
COll.dd you help me to understand the rationale behind the distribution of
counternarcotic funding? Why the recent switch from the encouragement of
licit crop production to forced eradication efforts?
What measures of effectiveness of alternative development vs. military
efforts have been used in arriving at this decision?
Have goals changed with the change in instruments?
What exactly are the goals which have been set for the increased military
funds? What instruments will be employed to ensure the successful
implementation of such efforts?
How will the effect of decreased alternatives to traditional means of
production and increased military might play out in the rural areas of
Bolivia? What are your predictiOns as to what will happen at the local level?
If Bolivians are forced to abandon the production of a crop for which there is
a huge demand (both domestically and internationally), in return for crops
which have very limited markets, how will this help Bolivia in their US
directed efforts to democratize and move towards export-led growth?

What are the possibilities of multilateral involvement?
What do you think the US and Bolivian governments could do to solicit
markets for the alternative products? Are there more cost effective means of
achieving the goals of alternative development strategies?
How is success defined as far as development projects are concerned? What
are the performance indicators?
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Interview Questions for Local Level Coca Producers:
When did you begin working with the project?
What were you doing before?
Why were you convinced to/decide to change?
How did you find out about the project?
Do you feel that your economic situation has improved since you began?
Why?
Do you know people who didn't switch to these crops? Why do you think
that they decided not to? How /what are they doing now?
Where do you feel you stood economically in relation to the rest of Bolivia
when you began this project? Now? Where do you see yourself in 5 years?
Where are most of your products sold?
How much do you receive for the alternative products? How does this
compare to what you were earning with coca/your previous form of
income)?
Do you have access to the necessary tools/assistance to cultivate the new
crops?
Are there people to help you plant the seeds?
Are there people to help you care for the crops?
Are there people to help you harvest the crops?
Who takes them to market?
What kind of help would you most like/ do you need with your crops? What
is missing?
What do you think the effects of the cutbacks in aid will be at the local level?
What will happen with the increased presence of military personnel?
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Methodology Appendix ill
New Questions
What are your initial responses to the GOB's recently proposed Strategy?
How do you feel it will be accepted at the local level?
How exactly will it change alternative development as it currently exists?
What effects will the decrease in funding for alternative development have
on the" success of the plan?
Will more farmers be willing to sign the convenios in the near fuhtre?
What will happen when the funds are gone?
Will the new Strategy compromise development agencies ability to complete
and introduce new projects?
Can coca farmers survive without their coca crops?
How will the shift from individual to community-based compensation affect
alternative development strategies?
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Chapter V
UPor la Dignidad"
BoUvia'~ new

plan for a coca-free nation in 2002

La Estrategia a,olipia"a de la Lucha Contra el Narcotriifico 1998-2002

On January 1st, 1998 the Bolivian government announced its proposal
for a new strategy concerning the struggle against illegal drug trafficking. It is
formally entitled, JlEstrategia Boliviana de la Lucha Contra el Narcotrafico
1998-2002,"(Bolivian Strategy for the Fight Against Narcotrafficking 1998
2002). More interesting, however, is the slogan being used to gain the support
of the Bolivian populous and the international community for the plan; "POT

La dignidad" ('for dignity.")
This idea of national dignity is an interesting way to market a difficult
proposal to the citizens of the second poorest nation in the Western
hemisphere. What exactly does dignity" mean in a culture where 70% of the
JI

population lives in poverty, where the illiteracy rate for those aged 15 and
over was 22.5% in 1995, where the average life expectancy is 59.6 years, and
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II
where 86 out of 1,000 babies die before they are a year old?jj It appears as
though one way that- the Bolivian government is attempting to convince its
people that they can be "dignified" is to stop the illegal production of coca, the
raw material used in the production of cocaine; a drug that is being consumed
at increasing rates in the most wealthy and powerful nation in the world.
Towards these ends, on New Year's Day the Government of Bolivia
announced its new countemarcotics strategy for the 21st century. The
proposed plan rejects the previous compensation program that provided
farmers with US$2,500 for every hectare of coca eradicated.56 Both Greg
Minnick and Peter Romero of th.e US State Department agree that the
previous strategy was a huge failure, claiming that the coca fanners would
eradicate a hectare of coca, collect their US$2,500, and reinvest a portion of the
money into the planting of new coca crops. 57 It was a vicious cycle. As a
result, a more community-based strategy was sought. The new Strategy
completely changes the rules of the game by transforming the nature of
compensation from individual to community-based.
The Bolivian government's new Strategy is centered upon four main
pillars: alternative development, prevention and rehabilitation programs,
interdiction, and the eradication of illegal coca. As President Banzer writes in
his formal introduction to th.e program, "each pillar acts together with the

jjLexis~NelUs Bolivia Country Report. Copyright 1995 Walden Publishing Ltd. p. 1.

~ A bectaee is a unit of measurement thai is tbe equivalent of 10,000 square meters or approximately 2.47
acres of land
57 Minnick, Gregory. Director, UNDCP Cochabamba, Bolivia. Interview. Cochabarnba, Bolivia. January
5. 1998; and Romero, Peter. US Departmeot of State, Principle Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
Latin American Affairs. Interview November 14, 1997. Washington DC.
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others. It is impossible to understand any of the actions without the support
of the other three. This is how the strategy is conceived."58 The main
objective of the new strategy is to use alternative development funds as an
economic incentive to encourage the eradication of all illegal coca crops.
Community-based strategies aim to increase accountability at the local
level. No longer will USAID or the GOB deal with farmers on an individual
basis. All negotiations are to be carried. out with recently formed "producer
associations," that consist of groups of farmers from a particular community
who have expressed an interest in the crop substitution programs. The
producer associations are now required to sign convenios, or agreements,
with the DIRECO. The DIRECO is an agency of the Bolivian Government,
that is funded by the US Embassy's NAS (Narcotics Affairs Section). The
DIRECO oversees all eradication operations in the O1apare, and maintains
control over the UMOPAR(Rural Mobile Patrol Unit), the branch of the
tropical police structure in charge of enforcement and coca eradication.
The agreements signed with the DIRECO commit the producer
associations to the complete eradication of all coca crops within a two year
period. After signing the agreement with DIRECO, the representatives of the
producer association are able to meet with a technicians at PDAR, who will
ask the representatives what their community most needs and desires from
the alternative development assistance. The technician will then outline
what the PDAR is willing and able to do for the community, and if both sides
58 "POT la

dignidad; Estrategia Boliviana de 1a Lucha Contra el Narcotrafico 1998-2002." Document of the
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feel that the deal is fair, the agreement is put into action. According to Jack
Roscholt, the Director of DAl, an organization also under the auspices of
USAID, aid will begin to flow into the community within 16 weeks after the
signing.59
In signing the convenio the farmers now acknowledge that they have

made a formal commitment to the Bolivian and United States governments
to eradicate all of their coca in the next two years. The farmers lose their
ability to claim ignorance about the eradication issues. They sign an
agreement and the deal is done.

Only after this process has been completed are the coca farmers eligible
to receive alternative development funds, which include funds set aside for
III

the construction, maintenance, and improvement of infrastructure. While to
date, 2,974 kilometers of roads have been. improved to all weather standard or
maintained, and 83 bridges have been built60 , there are still large areas of the
Chapare without such services (Please See Map Insert of Chapare Region).
Without access to markets, or assistance in the cultivation of licit crops, the
coca farmers will remain just that; coca farmers. Without adequate funding
for alternative development projects, there can be no hope of a successful
move towards the production and marketing of licit crops in the region.
In addition to the new focus on community-based compensation, the

Bolivian government, under pressure from the United States to register net

Bolivian Government. La Paz. January 1998.
59 Roscho1t, Jack. Interview. Cochabamba. Bolivia. Janwuy 5, 1998.

60 Markey, John. "Alternative Development in

me Cbapare: Getting Results."
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decreases in coca cultivation in order to receive multilateral and bilateral
funds, has decided that it is time to begin forced eradication efforts. Thusfar
Bolivia has been successful in its quest to diversify the economy of the
Chapare region.

There are many more hectares of legal alternative crops

being cultivated than in the past. The area planted with licit crops has
increased £Tom about 60,000 hectares in 1993 to 96,500 hectares in 1997.61 The
Furthermore, the hectareage of licit crops planted in the Chapare is now three
times greater than coca cultivation, and 127% greater than 1986 when the
programs were implemented. 62 However, the Chapare region has failed to
register a corresponding decrease in the hectares of coca produced.
Top level officials in the United States fully support Bolivian President
Banzer's plans for the total eradication of all coca within a five year period.
General Barry McCaffrey, Director of the Office of National Drug Control
Poliey(ONDCP), is very impressed with the new plan and commented that
the title of the plan was impressive itself: With Dignity. It was, I think, the
collective opinion of the US representatives from the Department of State, from.
Customs, from Treasury, from AID, from the National Security Council and others, that
the concept was extremely well thought-out and deserved our support. We look
forward to working with President Banze.r's team in the years to come and in achieving
concrete results and the inexorable reduction of coca production to near zero levels in
five years. 63

Jose lnfantes, Administrator of the USAID Anti-Narcotics Division of
Alternative Development in Cochabamba, suggested that contrary to what US
6 IIbid
62lbid
63News Conference with General Barry McCaffrey, Director, Office of National Drug Control Policy and
Jorge Fernando Quiroga Ramirez, Vice President of Bolivia. Federallnformation Systems Corporation
Federal News Service. Marcb 3, 1998.
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politicians have claimed about the domestic origins of the new Bolivian plan,
the new program is actually a USAID-devised strategy to assist the
Government of Bolivia in its efforts to make the Chapare coca-free by 2002.64
It appears that this plan is being implemented by Americans to appease

American demands.

Finance Requirements for a Successful Strategy

The success of this program is dependent upon the economic support
of the international community. Bolivia does not have the economic
resources to fund all aspects of the proposed plan. As President Banzer states
in the Strategy's formal introduction,

The resources that Bolivia requires in this struggle are very large
and cannot be financed only by the Bolivians. I hope that the
additional resources that are outlined in the Strategy will be
provided by the international community who understands and
supports the sacrifices that Bolivia is making in this fight."65
Table #9 outlines the total funds being solicited by the GOB for each pillar of
the Strategy.

64

Infanles. Jose. Interview. Cochabamba, Bolivia. January 21. 1998.

6.5 Banzer. Hugo. npor la Dignidad.!" Introduction. La Paz, Bolivia. January 1998.
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Table #9
Finance Requirements for 1998-2002 Program
Program 1998-2002

SUS Millions

% of Iotal

1. Eradication

108

11.34

2. Alternative Development

700

77.32

3. Interdiction

129

9.67

4. Global Prevention

15

1.67

TOTALj

952

100

SQurce:"Por La Dignidad."p. 16.

The impressive aspect of the plan is that US$700 million is being
requested for alternative development projects. 1bi.s clearly signifies a
dedication, on the part of the GOB, to the success of community-based
alternative development strategies. The unfortunate aspect of the GOB's
newly-implemented drug policy is that it comes at a time when the US
Government is proposing a decrease in drug aid to Bolivia for 199B. President
66Banzer is referring to the threat of decreased funding as a "short-term
hiccup" in the marketing of the ·new strategy.67
The question still remains...il the United States is indeed dedicated to
supporting nations such as Bolivia in their efforts to stop the cultivation of
coca crops, then why are funds being cut when and where they are needed
most? The Office of National Drug Control Policy submitted to Congress a
$45

million request for drug aid to Bolivia in 1998.68 The request was initially

67Gedda, George. "Bolivia decries proposed aid cuts. The AssocioJed Press. Washington Dateline Section.
ft

March 2. 1998.

.

68 Ibid.
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denied, and not only was there no increase in funding for 1998, but funding
was actually decreased from the 1997 level of $34 million to a proposed $12
million for 1998.69 (See Table #10) This cut comes as a surprise when one
considers that Bolivia has been "certified" by the United States regarding their
efforts to thwart the drug trade since the Certification process was
implemented eleven years ago.

Table # 10
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
FY 1998 Budget Request
CUS$OOO)

FY 1996

FY 1997

FY 1998

Actual

Plan

Request

Bahamas

700

1,000

1,000

Bolivia

30,000

34,000

45,000

Brazil

290

500

1,000

Colombia

16,000

30,000

30,000

Ecuador

500

350

350

Guatemala

2,000

2,000

2,000

Jamaica

700

750

750

Mexico

2,200

8,000

8,000

Peru

18,500

23,000

40,000

Venezuela

500

600

600

Regional

~

MOO

i.QQQ

Subtotal

75,098

116,200

132,700

Laos

4,000

2,500

2,500

Pakistan

2,500

2,500

2,500

Narcotics Programs

Latin America

Asia!Africa/Europe

69 Ibid.
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Narcotics Programs

FY 1996

FY 1997

FY 1998

Actual

Plan

Request

FY 1996

FY 1997

FY 1998

Actual

Plan

Request

Thailand

1,500

3,000

3,000

Turkey

400

500

500

RegiQnal

M22

U!OO

llillQ

Subtotal

12,892

10,500

10,500

Interregional
Aviation Support
Total Country
Programs

25,755

31,500

32,000

113,745

158,200

175,200

Source: International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 1997. 1997 lNCSR Budget.

If we take a look at Table #10 we can see that Bolivia has been the

largest recipient of CQuntemarcotics hmds Qver the past twQ years, by a
substantial amQunt. In 1997, for the first time ever, Bolivia not only met the
criteria for certification, but went so far as to register a net decrease in coca
production-a 5% net decrease?O This has led Vice President Quiroga to
question why the funds are now being cut. He recently stated that, 'The
signal (from the US) is clear. If you are certified with flying colors, you lose
yom funding. That is the wrong message to send:"'] However, this is clearly
not the case when one considers that funding to Pel1.;l and Colombia increased
from 1997 to 1998. Peru, once the world's largest producer of coca, has seen its
overall production drQp by 40% in the past year. As a reward for its progress,
US aid to Peru grew frQm $26 million in 1997 to $31 million in 1998.n
So...what has caused the US government to propose the decrease in funding
fQr Bolivia while increasing funding for Peru and Colombia?

7l>Ramirez, Jorge Quiroga March 3. 1998 News Conference.
71Farah. Douglas. Section A. Page A14. March 3. 1998.
72 Ibid.
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Reasons for Cuts in US Drug Aid to Bolivia
There are various opinions and theories on why the US Congress has
proposed to decrease drug aid to Bolivia. Some claim that the decrease in
funds to Bolivia can be directly linked to the Clinton administration's desire
to allocate more funds to cOlUlternarcotics military operations in Colombia.
Republicans in Congress, led by R.ep. Benjamin A. Gihnan(N.Y.), successfully
sponsored a bill that directed the State Department to spend $35 million to .
supply Colombia with UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters and authorized $14
million to upgrade the Colombians' aging UH-IH Huey helicopters. 73
The State Department opposed buying the Black Hawks, arguing that the
Colombian police do not have the training to fly them or money to maintain.
them and that funds to other countries would have to be cut to pay for the
shift. Congress, however, did not buy State Department's argument, and
passed the bill.
Another factor that is rumored to have influenced the Clinton
administration's decision to cut aid to Bolivia has to do with Bosnia.
Representative Benjamin A. Gilman, a New York Republican and Chairman
of the House International Relations Committee, said that Clinton has
"mishandled the aid issue," suggesting that "the administration is trying to
take funds from Bolivia to pay for police training in Bosnia and making
Congress the scapegoat..." and that "the same administration that dropped the

73 Gedda, George. March 3, 1998.
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ball on Colombia in the first place is now trying to use a clear and carefully
targeted appropriations earmark as an excuse for chopping aid for yet another
Latin American ally in our war on drugs.'74

Clearly, there is debate as to the real reason why the US government
wants to cut drug aid to Bolivia. In Bolivia, the general consensus seems to
be that the majority of the expensive work, such as the construction of roads,
bridges, potable water systems, and rural electrification, has now been
completed. Both Gregory Minnick at the UNDCP and Claudia Vargas at
USAID stated that this was their opinion as to the real reason for cuts in
alternative development aid to the region.
Gregory Minnick emphasized that "most of the hard work has been
done,"7S and that along with the decentralization program that the Bolivian
government has been pursuing for the past few years, more responsibility is
lying with local level officials to use designated funds for such programs.
Local level government funds as well as private investment, both domestic
and international, are expected to now finance alternative development·
projects. As Minnick suggests, the UNDCP and UsAID have set the ground
for future efforts in the Chapare region, and are currently seeking an "exit
strategy. "76
However, while the Chapare has, according to USAID, turned from a
"rural backwater controlled by flareo-traffickers to one of Bolivia's growth
Bowers. Paige. "Bolivia's Number 2 presses for aid; McCaffrey backs drug-fighting plan." The
Washington Times. World Section. Part A. Page A19. Marcb 4, 1998.
75 Minnick Interview. La Paz, Bolivia January 5, 1998.
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76 Ibid.

.
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poles,

lf
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the region has failed to prove itself a secure or profitable venture for

large scale foreign direct investment. The majority of private investment in
the Chapare is "small adventure-types who are wi.ll.ing to take a .r.isk.''78
USAID emphasizes the increase in private investment in the region by citing
that 16 private firms have invested over $8.6 minion of their own resources
in alternative development related agroindustries.79 However, when this
figure of $8.6 million is compared with the estimated $700 million that the
Bolivian government estimated will be necessary to keep aitemaHve
development programs running for the next five years(See Table #9), we can
see that the $8.6 million is a relatively small amOUIi1:t of capital for such
projects.
While much progress has been made in the region over the past years,
it is still unstable. On account of the "rainy season," which lasts from JaIituary
through April, roads are many times made impassable by mudslides. This
past January, for example, the Santa Cruz-Cochabamba highway, that connects
the Chapare to two of Bolivia's largest cities" was shut down for
approximately one month on account of mudslides. Large tr,ucks destined for
both domestic and international markets were backed up for days, and were
only allowed to pass for two hour periods each day. The ,goods simply could
not get to market.

n

Markey, John. "'Alternative Development in the Chapare: Getting Results."
Roscholt. Jack. Interview. Cocbabamba, Bolivia January 6, 1998.
79 Markey, John. "Alternative Development in the Chapare: Getting Results."
78
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Large foreign operations are not willing to invest capital and time in an
area where there is consistent limited access to markets. This factor, coupled
with the political instability that plagues the region, scares potential investors
away from investing in the Chapare. The US State Department strongly
discourages foreigners to even visit the Chapare, never mind expand
commercially there. As a result, the outlook for substantial foreign
investment in the region m the ne'ar future, seems very unlikely. There
appears to be a policy gap here, the region simply is not yet ready for this next
step of private investment-led growth.
While Gregory Minnick's rationale of the UNDCP and USAID laying
the ground work for private investment to eventually take over is
reasonable, this time has yet to come. Private investment in the Chapare has
not yet reached sufficient levels to support the types of alternative
development projects currently needed in the Chapare. All thoughts of an
"exit strategy" must be postponed. USAID and UNDCP projects are the only
hope that coca fanners in the Chapare have for making any progress, even
though this progress may seem limited. With the proposed cut in funding
for such projects and increased pressure to forcefully eradicate coca, coca
fanners and development workers alike are facing tough times ahead.
This is one drawback of rural development strategies implemented by
large multilateral and bilateral lenders. The projects that they fund are
completely dependent upon the continued financial support of the
organizations. Once the flow of funds halts, the projects are unable to
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survive. As a result, the community must be actively engaged in every
process of the project, so that eventually they are no longer dependent upon
these organizations for their survival. As long as the community remains
dependent upon external sources of funds, the projects cannot be sustainable,
as they are subject to the whims of the donor organization.
However, in this case one must question the rationale of these
organizations in fostering this dependent relationship. If the coca farmers
were not so very dependent upon USAID funds, then USAID would not have
the ability to coerce the farmers into eradicating their crops. Once the coca
farmers attain a sustainable means of production, USAID loses its ability to
condition the flow of funds upon communities' adherence to their demands.

•
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Chapter VI
Anticipated Effects of the New Strategy
The real question is not why funding is being cut, but rather what
effects this reduction, coupled with the new Strategy, will have on coca
farmers in the Chapare region. Given the evidence from interviews
conducted in Bolivia, it is quite clear that the possibility of violent social and
political repercussions is quick!ly becoming a probability.
Given the current structure of United States countemarcotics policies
in Bolivia, altemative development projects are absolutely essential. They
are vital because they provide an altemative means of income for
cocaleros(coca pmducers) forced to eradicate their coca crops. In the past,
alternative development projects, mainly crop substitution programs, have
been implem.ented independent of crop eradication efforts. This has now
changed.
The decrease in funding for a!.temative development projects by both
the United States and Bolivia, coupled with the combination of eradication
and crop substitution efforts aimed to foster community-based development
will drive poor campesinos to desperation, destroying theiI livelihood
without offering any replacement. To date, there is no agricultural crop that
yields higher returns than coca. Consequently, the poor coca farmer is faced
with a no-win situation; if he refuses to eradicate all of his coca within the
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next two years, he risks losing his ability to maintain even a subsistence
lifestyle. If the coca farmer refuses to eradicate his coca, he loses access to all
alternative development assistance, including funds set aside for
infrastructure and basic sanitation programs for the community.
If the United States cuts drug aid to Bolivia, there will be less funding

for alternative development projects, particularly in light of the private
investment gap. This factor, in conjunction with the requirement to
eradicate all coca within two years, is tantamount to a declaration of war on
coca farmers. The inevitable consequence will be forced eradication, which
coca growers will resist to the death, as they will have no alternative.
Claudia Vargas at the PDAR disrussed her views on the subject.
Claudia outlined the program in detail. According to her, USAID has been
working under the guidelines of mandatory

convenicrs~,gningfor

the past

year, since February of 1997. Table #11 outlines the convenios signed as of
January 1998. In 1997, seventeen convenios were signed with coca producing
communities.
In looking at Table #11, we see that some 2;2.67 families agreed to

completely eradicate all of their coca by 1999. This means that 2,267 families
will be completely dependent upon the cultivation of alternative crops for
their survival within a two year period. When one considers that this is the
case, it becomes very clear why there has been such violent opposition to the
first stages of eradication procedures. It is one thing to make yet another
agreement with the GOB and USAID, it is another thing to stand by and
watch the police tear up your lone means of survival. Confrontation is
unavoidable.
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Table #11
Profile of the Areas Consolidated as "Coc~Free" Zones

,ot
Convenio

1
2
3

Name of
Organization
UAPAC
COOP
SANJUAN
COOP
ICHOA
ASPALMMiI

4

S

6
7
8
9

10
11

12
13
14
15

16
17
Totals
SQurce:

COOP
Agropecuaria
Litoral
Sindicato
Buena Vista
Sindicato 25
de Abril
ASIPA
Sindicato
Gualberto
Villaroel
Sindicato San
Luis
Sindicato
Seii.orde
Santiago
Sindicato
ViHa
Fernand!ez
Sin.dkato
Santa Fe
Sindicato 18
de Agosto
Sindicato
Sante Fe
Sindicato 18
de Agosto
Central
Ayopaya

Location

t of Families

Total Area
(hectares)

Area of Coca,
Declared

558

11,160

350

84

2,520

8

66

3,300

7

256

5,120

20

51

1,275

0

21

315

8

81

2,430

5

26

260

10

52

780

6

120

1,200

12

87

1,740

7

103

2,060

8

32

640

10

104

1,040

15

57

570

12

50

500

2

519

10,380

120

2,267

45,290

600

lrodeMayo
BuloBulo
Villa Andrade
Ichoa
22 de Mayo
]zarzama
Chipiri
il4 de Septiembre
Paraiso Todos
Santos
San Miguel
22 de Mayo

Mariposas
BuloBulo
Valle Ivirza
San Miguel
Ibuelo
6deAgosto
San Miguel
6de Agosto
Ibuelo
Villa 14 de
Septiembre
Puerto Aurora
Ayopaya

Unidad de ComicaciOn PDAR, Unidad de InformaciOn CORDEP/DAl
Fuente: DIRECO, Base de Datos CORDEP.

Vargas stressed that the program involves the distribution of seeds and
plants to substitute for the fanners' coca during the two years during which
he is continuously eradicating his coca crops. According to Claudia, the main
reason for the change in strategy is that alternative development programs
have been successful, and farmers are indeed prospering with certain
alternative crops.
However, the fact remains that while the cultivation of alternative
crops has increased, the amount of coca being grown in the region has failed
to decrease. Not only has it failed to decrease, but it has ,actuaLly increased.
(See Table #3) The coca farmers have taken advantage of new economic

opportunities without forsaking the old. In response to these faotors, the
Bolivian and US governments explicitly tied alternative development to
eradication in order to achieve both objectives. Furthermore, introducing the
community-based compensation challenged the independent peasant's
economic rationale.
They are essentially using the successes of alternative d.evelopment to
promote incentives for eradication. This shift in policy, in conjunction with
the change from individual to community-based compensation programs,
has produced a whole new set of rules by which the coca.l.eros are forced to
play.
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Effects of the New StrateGY on Development Actors

Jack Roscholt, Director of Development Alternatives Inc., has
particularly interesting insight on the subject. Mr. Roscholt's role is to
implement, oversee, and monitor the success of USAID's alternative
development projects in the Chapare. As such, he is dedicated to the
promotion of alternative crops in the Chapare region, not to decreasing coca
crops. The new program is very frustrating for him because it limits the
communities with which he can work, and also limits the funds to which he
has access for the completion of previously negotiated contracts and current
alternative development efforts.
Previously, agencies such as DAI could enter a communityl market the
alternative cropsl and then agree to help communities begin to cultivate the
licit agricultural products. Now the agencies are only allowed to work in " no
coca areas where the producer association has signed a convenio agreeing to
ll

eradicate all coca within two years. This is creating problems because as the
program is only in its first stages, there have yet to be a substantial amount of
convenios signed.(See Table #11) As a result, DAI's hands are tied.
Furthermorel while USAID and the GOB decided to allow USAID to continue
to work on all current projects with coca farmers, a majority of these proj'ects
were pilot programsl dependent upon the timely flow of fresh funds. These
farmers will now never see a penny of the new funds unless they agree to
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destroy all coca within two years, a commitment that many are finding
themselves unable and unwilling to make. 50
Jack Roscholt also stressed that the reason for the GOB's decision to
link alternative development efforts with eradication is because of the success
that alternative development is having in the region. Roscholt adamantly
claims that coca farmers are truly beginning to realize that there are other
crops that can be grown and marketed in the Chapare. He stated that the
farmers realize that "while the other crops may not be as good as coca, if they
put in a little hard work, they can make a living with them." SI
Roscholt also suggests that the cocaleros are a little more willing to sign
on to the plan because it is structured over a two year time period, which they
hope will provide adequate time to make the transition to licit crop
production. 82 However, unless there is a large increase in funding for
alternative development projects, or a drastic change in the development and
implementation of the projects, then the time frame will not be an issue. It
appears that the time frame is not what scares the coca farmers, but rather the
complete failure of the alternative crops to provide a means of survival.
Demand-driven, community-devised and implemented strategies are the
only hopes for engaging peasants in a sustainable development model.

80 Roscholt Interview. January 6, 1996.
8\
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Perceived Downfalls of the Strategy
A, The Plan Discriminates Against Non-Coca farmers

Roscholt highlighted two big downfalls of the new Strategy. First, the
new Strategy ignores the farmers who have already eradicated their coca
crops, along with other farmers who simply do not grow coca. Farmers who
previously agreed to eradicate their coca crops now have no access to
alternative development aid because they no longer have coca as a bargaining
tool. Ironically, the plan is actually rewarding those who have chosen not to
obey the law. If the Bolivian government's aim is to register net reductions
in coca crops, then the Strategy seems to be inherently flawed. If there is an

-economic reward for being a coca producer, why not plant some coca and
present yourself as such. This completely contradicts the GOB's objective.
Fernando Garcia, a well-respected academic and currently the Director
of the Political Studies Department at the Universidad Mayor San Simon in
Cochabamba, also pointed to this issue. He explained that the program is
based upon presenting farmers with a real incentive to eradicate their

co~

crops. However, if you do not have coca crops, you are not a candidate for the
alternative development funds. As a result, farmers who previously did not
have coca, realize that they can get money from the Bolivian Government if
they do, in fact, have coca crops. Garcia claims that this type of program would
in fact encourage those with coca to eradicate their crops, while
simultaneously encourage non-coca farmers to plant new bushes. This could
potentially lead to an increase in coca crops, defeating the purpose of the
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entire strategy.83 This would certainly be consistent with the economic
rationality of the peasant.

B. The Plan Affects Community Oxganization Processes

A second effect of the Program that Jack Roscholt pointed out is how
the plan changes the central theme around which cocaleros will now
organize. Previously cocaleros have formed into "sindicatos," or unions.

These groups are made up of groups of farmers, usually from a few close
communities, who produce a common product, such as pineapples. The
farmers join together in order to maintain more power in both economic and .
political matters. However, the new Strategy clearly wants to avoid being
associated with political groups, and works instead with producer
associations. The producer associations are groups of community members
who jom together in supporting each other in agricultural and commuruty
based issues.
These two groups are hardly exclusive. Many farmers in the same
sindicato will find themselves in the same producers association as their
neighbor. However, the purposes of the two groups are different. The new
Strategy deals exclusively with producer associations. The issue here is that
the groups are now being formed around their commitment to eradicate coca,
along with the organization of alternative development funds.

83 Garcia, Fernando. Interview. Cochabamba, Bolivia January 8, 1998.

86

The problem is that this strategy could potentially pin community
members against each other if one farmer simply can't go along with the
eradication because he has been unsuccessful with the alternative crops.
Theoretically this type of community-based program is intended to prevent
farmers from "falling though the cracks/' assuming that the farmers will
assist each other. However, the fact that the farmers are now organized
around the central theme of eradication is cause for concern because
community-based support is all that they have right now, and if they lose
that, all political and economic leverage will be gone.
The Bolivian government is fully aware of this. Promoting positive
working relationships at the grassroots level is the way to address the local
needs of a community. In contrast, the new Strategy forces community
members to take the responsibility of ensuring accountability of eachother.
While this strategy is probably better than further militarizing the drug war,
there is a real question about the long run integrity of such a program. An
external threat, such as the withdrawal of funding, is not the way to promote
confidence in community processes. Rather than a source of support,. the
group becomes a vehicle for punishment and promoting suspicion. The
Strategy could promote conflict within the community itself, making it
virtuaUy impossible to achieve a successft.tl development strategy.
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To Sign or Not to Sign: The Cocaleros Dilemma

Now, let us tum to the way the plan is being interpreted at the local
level in the Chapare. By the manner in which events have played out in the
Chapare, to date, the program is not being well received. On January 23, 1998
an important meeting was held between USAID officials and the
representatives of producer associations in Villa 14 de Septiembre, a town in
the Chapare. A majority of the representatives whom attended belonged to
associations that had yet to sign the new agreements. The meeting was a
marketing tool on the part of the GOB.
The comments of one cocalera woman and her husband, who attended
the meeting help to illustrate the complexities involved in detennining
whether or not to sign on with USAID and the GOB. The husband happened
to be the leader of their producer association, and the woman was the head of
the "women's group" in their small community. Interestingly, the husband
and the wife shared very opposing views of how the matter shoUld be
handled.
The wife argued that signing a contract to get rid of all coca in the next
two years is simply not feasible. She explained that while they do not rely
upon anyone crop to sustain them, coca is by far their most reliable and
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marketable crop, and that in a way it is their "safety net."84 However, she
expressed her concerns about not signing the agreements, because it will be
very hard to survive without the alternative development aid. She said that
it is a very frustrating situation, and many families in the Chapare are very
distressed about the new program.
The woman also suggested that a majority of the people in her
producer association were currently opposed to signing such an agreement,
although they were not sure what steps to take instead. This was the precise
reason why her husband had come to the meeting; he needed advice on how
to convince the members that this was the right thing to do. His attitude was
essentially one of resignation. He too was afraid to commit to the complete
eradication of coca, but didn't see any other option. In the face of losing all
alternative development aid, he decided that signing the agreement was the
lesser of two evils. as
Claudia Vargas of PDAR was present during this conversation. She
sadly explained to me the reason why if was imperative that these
associations sign on soon: funds were quickly running out. This is the reason
that USAID and the PDAR gave to the representatives as to why they must
encourage their fellow producers to commit now, and not wait. There is a
fixed budget for alternative development projects, and when the funds are

gone they will not be replaced any time soon. The USAID officials strongly
84 Cotalera InteliView. Villa Catorce de Septiembre. Chapare. Bolivia. USAIDlProducer Associations
Meeting. January 23. 1998.
8S Unfortunately. because of the very limited amount of research time in the Chapare, it was impossible 10
speak with other coca producers about their attitude towards the corrvenios.
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urged the communities to move forward immediately, or run the very real
risk of being left out in the cold. In recalling our discussion about the
bargaining power that USAID wields as a direct result of its funding of vital
projects, we must wonder whether or not this threatened cut in funding is
being used to force cocaleros to immediately agree to the conditions of the
agreement.
As of January 1, 1998, seventeen convenios had been signed. Each of

these convenios was signed by the "dirigentes"(representatives) of each
producer association, also known as "federations." The number of families
involved in each of the federations ranges from 558 to 21,86 depending upon
the size of the community, and the demand for such services. It is also
important to remember that not all communities in the Chapare are eligible
to receive USAID alternative development funds. Only those communities
that USAID has chosen, and are easily accessible by previously constructed
roads, are candidates for the program.
Now that we have explored the reasoning behind the development of
the new s.trategy, and the probable effects that it will have in the Chapare, let
us now examine the effects that the Strategy has had over the four months
since its creation. While these are clearly short-term responses to the
program, they are indicators of the events and conflicts to come.

de coca." Chan compiled by Claudia Vargas of the
PDAR Chan included in PDAR's "Annual Report of the Establishment of Coca-free Zones."
Cochabamba, Bolivia January 1998. Translations are mine.

86 "Perfil de las areas consolidadas como zonas libres
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Chapter VII
The Current Situation: Crisis in the Chapare
The Crisis
Coca farmers are not taking kindly to the GOB's new Strategy.
Frustrated by the forced eradication efforts that are taking place in the face of
inadequate altemative development assistance, coca farmers have been
forcefully opposing ,the GOB's eradication measures, claiming that the
government has not held up its end of the agreements signed. The clashes
between the two sides had reportedly left 10 people dead and 38 injured as of
April 27, 1998.87

Until March 31, 1998 coca farmers in the Chapare received $2,500 in US
cash for every hectare (2.47 acres) of their crop that they eradicated. For
reasons stated in Chapter 4, the program has been deemed largely
lmSuccessful in that coca cultivation has not fallen. Consequently, the GOB
has decided to tum towards a more community-based approach in their
efforts to eradicate all illegal coca from the region by 2002. As a result, the
amount of compensation was lowered to US$1,650 per hectare eradicated,

87 "Una contradicci6n que ensombrece el di~ogo sobre el Chapare; Banzer propone la pacificaci6n
manteniendo la rnilitarizaci6n:' Los Tiempos. Cocbabamba, Bolivia. April 27, 1998. Translations are
mine.
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beginning April 1, 1998.88 The rationale is that the resulting US$850 per
eradicated. hectare is to be put towards the development of community
pwjects and works.
This strategy is in tine with the Bolivian government's desire to
promote community-based development, as opposed to individual
compensation programs. After October 1998, the entire US$2,500 per hectare
eradicated will be devoted to community projects.. The compensation
payments will be further decreased starting in 1:999, and will be cut altogether
in 2002. 89 This Strategy is a direct reswt of the GOB's "Estrategia Bolivian.a de

la Lucha Contra el NaJi'cotnifico 1998·2002," that strives to pmduce .a

coca~free

Chapare by this time.
The Bolivian government estimates that there are less than 30,000
hectares (74,100 acres) of coca in the Chapare that must be destroyed by 2002. 90
The set goal for 1998 is the eradication of 7,000 hectares (17,290 acres) according
to official figures. As discussed in Chapte'r 4, the United States bankroUed
US$47 million of Bolivia's

anti~drug

fight in 1997. A proposal to lower the

amount to US$12 million was rejected by the Bolivian government which
sent Vke President Jorge Quiroga to Washington DC in March 1998 to
renegotiate the amount of assistance..
On April 1st, 1998, the day that the first cuts in compensation took

place, the coca farmers took to the streets in protest. The cocaleros blocked the
88 Qu:iJoga, Carlos. "Bolivia cuts coca growers' eradication payments." CNN f{eadline News Homepage.
La Paz, Bolivia. April 2. iJ.998.
89

Ibid.

9Olbid.
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only road that connects the Clrlapare with the two largest domestic markets of
Cochabamba and Santa Cruz, with stones and tree trunks. As of April 2, 1998
three coca farmers had been killed in clashes with Bolivian police forces
attempting to clear the roads. 91 The violence and protests continued for one
week straight until finally a temporary peace agreement was made, with the
GOB agreeing to temporarily cease eradication efforts.
However, talks to end the week-long strike were quickly halted when
government negotiators refused to accept the presence of Evo Morales, leader
of the Bolivian coca growers, at the negotiating table.92 It has long been
speculated that Morales is in cahoots with leaders of the O1aparean cocaine
circuit.93 Consequently many government officials refuse to negotiate with
him on such matters. However, he remains the lead activist for coca fartrler's

rights, and as a result receiv·es much support from the cocaleros. Milton
Gomez, a cocalero leader claims that contrary to government claims that the
coca farmers are confusing the negotiations, Jlin reality it is the government
that is breaking off the dialogue.//94
On Wednesday April 8,

~998

hundreds of police and army troops took

over Bolivia's ,coca producing region and cleared away roadblocks after a week
of violence that left at least four people dead. 95 Soldiers encountered some

9~Ibid.

92 "Bolivian unions break off talks aimed at en.ding strike." Reuters News Service. La Paz, Bolivia. April

8. 1998.
93 Morales, in contrast. claims that President Danzer is linked with drug tr'lIffickers. He has committed to
proving the validity of his accusations. Ibid.
94 Ibid.
95 "Bolivian army and police take control of drug producing region" CNN Intel"llCtive Network Homepage.
Worl'd News. April 9. 1998.
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resistance, but were able to clear the road for the hundreds of buses and trucks
that had been stranded for nearly a week in the Chapare since the initial
roadblocks were constructed. Coca farmers had used rocks and fallen trees to
block traffic on the main road linking the eastern and western regions of
Bolivia. As one journalist stated, "they were demanding an end to coca leaf
eradication and government plans to eradicate coca. They want more
alternative development in the region."96 Security forces were once again
called in to remove debris from the main road, and this time seven people,
including a baby suffocated by tear gas, were killed in the clashes between
protesters and security forces. 97
On April 15, 1998 many cocalero leaders fled to the mountains in order

to devise a strategy to deal with the current situation They were f,orced to do
so after police forces restricted the citizens of the Chapare to circulate or
assemble between the hours of 8pm cm.d 6am.98 The police- were attempting to
prevent the farmers from organizing a formal pmtest to eradication efforts.
In addition, military bases were installed in all schools located near coca

fields. Under these repressive conditions, the UMOPAR was able to forcefully
eradicate close to 20 hectares of excedentary coca.99
As a result of such impassioned clashes between civilian and police

forces, on April 20, 1998 the Bolivian military constructed a "general
headquarters," approximately three kilometers outside of Villa 14 de
96 Ibid.
97 "Bolivian unions break off talks aimed at ending strike." April 8, 1998.
98 ''Toque de Queda en el Cbapare." Los Tiempos. Cocbabamba, Bolivia. April 16, 1998.
99 Ibid.
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Septiembre. In compliance with "superior orders," they are adamantly
restricting the entrance of all government officials, diputados(congressional
representatives), union leaders, journalists, and regular citizens into the
region. 100 Human rights groups seeking to put an end to the conflict have
also been denied access to the Chapare. The Bolivian government justified
the military's actions by stating that the cocaleros are to blame for the climate
of violence in the Chapare, and are trying to "sabotage" the new Anti-drug
Strategy. 101

Causes of the Outrage

Why are Bohvian coca farmers adamantly opposing the forced
era,dication efforts of the GOB? Is it solely a result of the complete failure of
alternative development strategies to provide these people with ,the ability to
survive by cultivating lidt crops? Or, is there another factor to the story?
While alternative development efforts In the Chapare have failed, to
provide coca farmers with the ability to survive solely through the
cultivation of such crops, there is another factor at play in this case. The
BoHvian government has lied to the farmers. Coca growers claim that the
GOB has failed to hold up its end of the bargain by providing adequate
alternative development assistance to the farmers who have agreed to

100, Baspineiro. Alex Contreras. "Un clima de violencia que recrodece Los Cocaleros iDstalaron un 'cuanel
general' en el Ohllpare." Los Tiempos. Coohabarnba, Bolivia. April 20, 1998.
101 [bid.
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eradicate their coca fields. The farmers are not concerned with the reason
why the aid has been cut, and it is very hard to be sympathetic to the plight of
the Bolivian government's struggle to appease US demands, when one
cannot feed his family.
In many developing nations in Latin America, the degree of trust

between government officials and the poorest of its poor citizens, is very low.
Oftentimes the poor peasants are the victims of a relatively ineffective and
bureaucratic governing body. When the rural poor are upset about an issue,
they will many times march, strike, or devise another strategy in order to get
the attention of government officials who are more concerned with issues
such as trying to engender the financial support of more powerful nations.
Many times, as a consequence of these demonstrations, concessions are
made to the protesters in the form of a written agreement. Peasant leaders
negotiate the terms of the contract with government officials, and the leaders
return home in hopes that the agreement will be upheld. Most of the time
the agreement is simply tossed aside by the government more concerned with
other issues. 1his is precisely what has taken place in Bolivia throughout the
years between disgruntled coca farmers and the Bolivian government.
However, this time the coca faxm.ers are not willing to let the
government ignore their cries for help. They have been pushed too far. As
Evo Morales, leader of the cocaleros stated,
compliance with agreements and the well being of coca
producers are subjects which the authorities don't care about.
Government officials don't care about the well being of cocaleros
or other poor sectors. All hopes for finding a peaceful solution
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to the problem are in the hands of the Bolivian government as
the coca farmers have done all that they can dO."I02
This time the alternative to not receiving adequate development funds is the
inability to maintain a subsistence living, as coca crops, the "safety net," are
being taken away. The combination of insufficient alternative development

funds and forced eradication is driving growers to resist the forced eradication
to their death, as they have no alternative.

Final Conclusions

While tying eradication to alternative development will serve the
intended purpose of decreasing the cocaleros options in regards to coca
production, it will have the unintended effect of increasing violence. The
adoption of a strategy that forces coca farmers to become completely
dependent upon alternative crops for their basic survival, would require that
the alternative crops be legitimate substitutes for coca. As we have seen,' this
is not the case.
Alternative development has been successful in increasing. the
alternatives to coca. However, the alternative products are cultivated as

complements to, not substitutes for coca production. A more diverse range of
goods are now successfully produced in the Chapare. The rational farmer has
indeed responded to the economic incentives to produce more, taking good
102 Lemuz.

Adalid Cabrera. "Cocaleros no estan en contra de la erradicaci6n. pero COD des.arroUo
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advantage of additional inputs, such as seeds, fertilizer, and infrastructure.
However, it is imperative to understand that the farmers, by and large,
produce the new products as a complement to illicit production, rather than a
substitute for it.
If the goal is not to increase pineapple and banana production, but to

decrease coca production, and substitution efforts have failed, eradication
appears to be the next rational supply side step. Straight out military action
would cause an uproar domestically and internationally. Consequently, it
appears as though USAID and the GOB have used the convenios to make
community groups the non-militarized guarantors of eradication. While
individual farmers may be abile to quietly produce Doth

~icit

and illicit goods,

as a comm:unity this is harder to conceal.
While signing these convenios may indeed reduce the hectares of Goca
produced in the Chapare, the seeds of conflict wUl be planted in place of
collaborative community building. Without a cohesive demand-driven.
community based strategy, that employs an effective means of alternative
production, there can be no hope of a sustainable shift towards licit crop
production. USAID

,and the GOB will most likely see a decrease in hectares of

coca produced, and maybe one day they will actually reach their goal of a coca
free Chapare. However, one must ask himself what Bolivia will then do with
this large sector of people with no means of survival. Will USAID leave

altemativo." Hay. La Paz, Bolivia. April 20, 1998. p.3. Translations are mine.
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Bolivia when the coca leaves Bolivia? If so, what will be the GOB's next

Strategy?
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